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Abstract
We consider an on-demand service platform using earning sensitive independent providers
with heterogeneous reservation price (for work participation) to serve its time and price sensitive
customers with heterogeneous valuation of the service. As such, both the supply and demand
are “endogenously” dependent on the price the platform charges its customers and the wage
the platform pays its independent providers. We present an analytical model with endogenous
supply (number of participating agents) and endogenous demand (customer request rate) to
study this on-demand service platform. To coordinate endogenous demand with endogenous
supply, we include the steady-state waiting time performance based on a queueing model in the
customer utility function to characterize the optimal price and wage rates that maximize the
profit of the platform (as well as the total welfare). We first analyze a base model that uses
a fixed payout ratio (i.e., the ratio of wage over price), and then extend our model to allow
the platform to adopt a time-based payout ratio. We find that it is optimal for the platform
to charge a higher price when demand increases; however, the optimal price is not necessarily
monotonic when the provider capacity or the waiting cost increases. Furthermore, the platform
should offer a higher payout ratio as demand increases, capacity decreases or customers become
more sensitive to waiting time. We also find that the platform should lower its payout ratio as
it grows with the number of providers and customer demand increasing at about the same rate.
We use a set of actual data from a large on-demand ride-hailing platform to calibrate our model
parameters in numerical experiments to illustrate some of our main insights.
Keywords: On-Demand Services, Endogenous Supply and Demand, Queueing Models.
1 Introduction
Recent advances in internet/mobile technologies have enabled the creation of various innovative on-
demand service platforms for providing on-demand services anytime/anywhere. Examples include
grocery delivery services (e.g., Instacart, Google Express), meal delivery services (e.g., Sprig, Blue
Apron), and food delivery services directly from restaurants (e.g., DoorDash, Deliveroo (U.K.),
UberEats, Yelp Eat24), consumer goods delivery services (e.g., UberRush), dog-walking services
(e.g., Wag), and ride-hailing services (e.g., Uber, Lyft, Didi). Furthermore, the adoption of mobile
applications as well as the availability of on-demand service platforms increase the expectations
and demands of impatient customers for quick services.
To meet dynamic customer demand anytime/anywhere, it is economical for on-demand service
firms to use independent providers (or agents) to fulfill customer requests quickly. However, us-
ing independent agents to deliver on-demand services can be challenging, as work participation of
independent providers is primarily driven by earnings. As independent agents do not get compen-
sated for idle times, earnings depends on wage rate and utilization, whereas utilization depends
on customer demand. At the same time, the demand associated with time and price sensitive
customers depends on two key factors: price and waiting time. Since customer’s waiting time is
highly dependent on the number of participating agents (which is a function of agent’s wage and
customer demand), the “supply” of participating agents and the “demand” of customer requests
are endogenously dependent on the wage and the price specified by the firm.
An on-demand service firm needs to analyze the underlying interactions between supply and
demand so as to select the optimal wage and price. The firm must carefully coordinate endogenous
supply and demand in different time periods by: (1) setting the right wage (i.e., compensation)
to get the right supply (i.e., the right number of earning sensitive participating agents); and (2)
charging the right price to control the right demand (i.e., the right number of time and price
sensitive customers). To elaborate, consider the simple case when the demand is fixed. If the firm
offers a higher wage, more agents will participate and customer satisfaction will increase due to
a quicker service. However, each participating agent will earn less due to low utilization. On the
other hand, if the firm offers a lower wage, fewer agents will participate and customer satisfaction
will decrease due to longer waiting times.
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In view of the intricate relationship between endogenous supply and demand through wage and
price selections, we develop an analytical framework to examine how an on-demand service firm
should set its price rate for the customers and its wage rate for the providers. In our framework,
we use a queueing model to capture the underlying waiting time where both supply (i.e., number of
providers) and demand (i.e., customer arrival rate) are “endogenously” dependent on wage, price
and other operating factors. Our model captures an operating environment where (1) time and price
sensitive customers are “heterogeneous” in their valuation of the service; and (2) earning sensitive
independent providers are “heterogeneous” in their reservation earning rate (i.e., the minimum
wage for work participation).
We only consider time-based pricing (instead of dynamic pricing) in our analytical framework,
i.e., the price rate can change across different time periods, but is known in advance to customers.
Also, we only consider time-based wages so that the wage schedule is known in advance to service
providers. Besides the fact that time-based pricing (and wages) is practical, it is considered to be
fairer than the dynamic pricing/wages that is not known to customers/providers in advance. For
instance, the behavior experiments conducted by Haws and Bearden (2006) reveal that consumers
viewed price changes within very short time periods as being more “unfair” than price changes over
a more extended period of time. Therefore, for practical reasons and for tractability, we focus on
time-based strategy in this paper.
We first use the analytical framework to construct a base model for a common situation in
which an on-demand service platform adopts a fixed payout ratio of wage over price to pay its service
providers. (Throughout this paper, we refer to “payout ratio” as the wage offered to the providers as
a percentage of the price paid by the customers.) By including waiting time performance based on
an M/M/k queueing model in the customer utility function, we analyze the optimal price and wage
rates that maximize the expected profit of the service platform. We conduct extensive numerical
experiments to generate managerial insights on how to select the optimal price and wage rates for
the platform. We further develop a good approximation of the steady-state waiting time function
to provide analytical results that support the insights derived from our numerical experiments.
For the base model, we find that the platform should increase the price rate (and the wage
rate accordingly) when customer demand increases. This result thus supports an on-demand ride-
hailing service platform that uses a fixed payout ratio (such as Uber) of charging a higher price (and
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offering a higher wage) during rush hours when the customer demand is high. Interestingly, we
find that the optimal price (and wage) rate is not necessarily monotonic in the maximum number
of available service providers.
We then extend our base model to analyze the general situation in which the on-demand service
platform can use a time-based payout ratio to pay the providers in order to maximize its profit. We
analyze the optimal price and wage rates and evaluate the potential benefit of using a time-based
payout ratio over a fixed payout ratio. Similar to the base model, we use an approximation of
the waiting time function to provide analytical results that support the insights derived from our
numerical experiments. We further extend our analysis to a more general setting under which the
objective is to maximize the platform’s profit plus the welfare of the consumers and providers.
For the general model (based on time-based payout ratio), we find that the optimal price and
wage rates increase as customer demand increases. Interestingly, the impact of service capacity on
the optimal price rate is more subtle. We find that the optimal price is not necessarily monotonic
as the maximum number of available service providers increases. Similarly, the optimal price is not
necessarily monotonic as waiting cost increases. This non-monotonic property can be explained by
the queueung effects captured in the customer utility function. We also find that, when the cus-
tomer’s valuation of the service and the provider’s earning reservation are uniformly distributed,
the optimal payout ratio increases when demand increases, service capacity decreases, or customers
become more sensitive to waiting time. In other words, the platform should increase its payout
ratio at time periods with high demand, but reduce its payout ratio when the number of regis-
tered independent providers increases. For urgent on-demand services with highly time sensitive
customers, the firm needs to increase its payout ratio to attract more service providers to handle
the increasingly impatient customers. We also find that the platform should lower its payout ratio
as it grows with the number of providers and customer demand increasing at about the same rate.
Our results also show that the profit can be greatly reduced if the platform uses a fixed payout
ratio that is far from the optimal time-based payout ratio, and that the optimal time-based payout
ratio can vary widely depending on specific operating characteristics. This implies that, while it is
simple for the platform to share a fixed percentage of its revenue with its independent providers,
the platform should adopt a time-based payout ratio to maximize profitability across different time
periods when the underlying operating characteristics can change significantly. We hope our results
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might motivate on-demand service firms adopting a fixed payout scheme to carefully re-evaluate
the effectiveness of such a fixed payout scheme.
This paper is organized as follows. We provide a brief review of related literature in Section
2. Section 3 presents our modeling framework of endogenous supply and demand along with
heterogeneous providers and customers. In Section 4, we develop our base model for analyzing
a common situation in which the on-demand platform adopts a fixed payout ratio. We analyze
the optimal price and wage rates that maximize the platform’s profit using extensive numerical
experiments. We further develop a good approximation scheme to provide analytical support of
the insights derived from the numerical experiments. In Section 5 we extend our base model to
analyze the general situation in which the platform can use a time-based payout ratio in order to
maximize its profit. We further extend our analysis to the case when the objective of the platform
is to maximize its own profit plus the welfare of the consumers and providers. In Section 6, we
construct some illustrative numerical examples based on actual data provided by Didi: the leading
on-demand ride-hailing service in China. We conclude the paper in Section 7. For ease of exposition,
all mathematical proofs for the results in the main text are provided in an Appendix A.
2 Literature Review
Our paper relates to pricing strategies in two-sided markets in the industrial organization literature.
Our framework is akin to the models developed by Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Armstrong
(2006) in the following sense. Our framework studies a service platform that maximizes its profit by
charging prices (wage can be viewed as a negative price) to both sides of the market, which captures
some positive “cross-group” externalities, i.e., the utility of an agent in one side increases with the
number of agents in the other side. However, our framework differs from their setting in two
important aspects. First, our framework incorporates a queueing model, which is a salient feature
of a ride-sharing platform. As such, our framework also captures the within-group effects in which
an increase in customer demand would reduce customer utility due to an increase in waiting time in
the demand side, and an increase in service providers would reduce provider earnings due to lower
utilization in the supply side. We shall further discuss how the non-linear queueing effect can affect
the structural results in Section 5.2. Second, our framework considers a different objective function.
Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) use the product of the difference in price and wage rate, supply and
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demand in the objective function. Hu and Zhou (2017) use the product of the difference in price
and wage rate and the minimum of supply and demand in the objective function. In contrast, our
framework uses the product of the difference in price and wage the “throughput rate”. Notice that
the throughput rate is a non-separable function of the arrival rate (or throughput) and the number
of servers in an equilibrium, and these two factors depend on the underlying price and wage rates.
Our paper belongs to an emerging stream of research that examines operations and pricing issues
arising from the sharing economy; see e.g., Benjaafar et al. (2015), Fraiberger and Sundararajan
(2015), and Jiang and Tian (2015) examined a customer’s decision to purchase or to rent assets in
the presence of “product sharing platforms” such as Airbnb. By crawling data from Airbnb, Li et
al. (2015) showed empirically that “professional” owners earned more. For many of such sharing
platforms, the owners set the price, the platforms set the payout amounts to the owners, and
customers often reserve the service in advance. In contrast, our paper studies on-demand service
platforms which provide time-sensitive service in an on-demand manner and addresses different
decision issues in managing the underlying service request mechanisms.
Recent developments of various on-demand service platforms such as Uber and DoorDash (see
Kokalitcheva (2015), Wirtz and Tang (2016), and Shoot (2015)) have motivated researchers to
explore various operational issues. First, there is an on-going debate regarding the definition of
independent contractors for various on-demand service platforms (e.g., see Roose (2014)). At the
same time, it is of interest to examine how dynamic wage affects supply, especially when indepen-
dent providers can freely choose whether and when to work. Chen and Sheldon (2015) examined
transactional data associated with 25 million trips obtained from Uber and showed empirically that
dynamic wage (due to surge pricing) could entice independent drivers to work for longer hours. Shel-
don (2016) analyzed data from a peer-to-peer ride-sharing firm to examine the supply elasticity
of individual contractors in the ride-sharing market. Moreno and Terwiesch (2014) also examined
empirically the independent contractor’s bidding behavior on freelancing platforms. Allon et al.
(2012) explored the process for matching providers to consumers when capacities were exogenous.
A number of researchers have recently studied the impact of wage and price on supply and for
on-demand services and examined whether it would be beneficial for an on-demand service firm to
adjust its prices and wages dynamically based on real-time system information including the current
number of customers requesting service and the number of providers in the system. Riquelme et al.
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(2015) and Cachon et al. (2015) compared the impact of static versus dynamic prices and wages.
When customers were heterogeneous in terms of valuation and the payout ratio was exogenously
given, Riquelme et al. (2015) found that static pricing performed well. On the other hand, Cachon
et al. (2015) found that surge pricing performed well when customers were homogeneous and
the payout ratio was endogenously determined. When the profit function of the platform is the
minimum of demand (a linear function of price) and supply (a linear function of wage), Hu and Zhou
(2017) showed that it is optimal for the platform to offer a constant payout ratio, which depends
on the price and wage sensitivity coefficients of the linear demand and supply functions. Moreover,
their main focus is to provide performance bounds for an endogenized fixed payout ratio. Gurvich
et al. (2015) developed a newsvendor-style model to examine the optimal price and wage decisions.
This stream of research has assumed that customer demand is independent of waiting time and
service capacity is independent of system utilization over time. In contrast, our model captures
the rational behavior of customers who are sensitive to waiting time (and price) and independent
providers who are sensitive to earnings which depend on the system utilization.
One research stream in the queueing literature has studied pricing decisions for services where
customers can incur waiting or delay costs. In particular, a number of research papers have ex-
amined an operating environment that uses a static uniform (non-discriminatory) pricing strategy
for heterogeneous customers. Afeche and Mendelson (2004) analyzed the revenue-maximizing and
socially optimal equilibria under uniform pricing for heterogeneous customers and found that the
classical result that the revenue-maximizing admission price was higher than the socially-optimal
price (e.g., see Naor (1969)) could be reversed under a more generalized delay cost structure. Zhou
et al. (2014) analyzed the structure of the optimal uniform pricing strategies for two classes of cus-
tomers with different service valuations and waiting time sensitivities. Armony and Haviv (2003)
and Afanasyev and Mendelson (2010) studied the competition between two firms under uniform
pricing for two classes of heterogeneous customers. All the above research papers were based on
the assumption that capacity was exogenously given. In contrast, our paper considers the situation
where service capacity is endogenously dependent on wage and system utilization.
Finally, our model is closely related to some recent work by Taylor (2016). To our knowledge,
Taylor (2016) is the first to examine pre-committed price and wage based on customer demand
and other operating factors in the context of on-demand services. He compared the optimal prices
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when the providers were independent contractors or regular employees, and examined the impact
of waiting time sensitivity on the optimal price and wage using a two-point distribution for both
the customer valuation of the service and the provider’s reservation earning rate. Our model allows
these two distributions to be continuous, and complements Taylor’s work in two important ways.
First, our focus is to examine the impact of demand rate, waiting time sensitivity, service rate, and
the size of available providers (who are on-reserve) on the optimal price, wage and payout ratio.
Second, in addition to maximizing its profit, we also consider the case when the firm maximizes
the sum of its own profit and the total consumer and provider surplus.
3 A Modeling Framework with Price and Time Sensitive Cus-
tomers and Earning Sensitive Service Providers
We consider an on-demand service platform that coordinates randomly arriving (price and time
sensitive) customers with (earning sensitive) independent service providers. To simplify our expo-
sition, we shall use on-demand ride-hailing service platforms (such as Uber) to illustrate our model
formulation and results throughout this paper. However, our model can also be used to study other
on-demand service applications.
Customers arrive randomly at the platform to request for service, and each service request
consists of an (random) amount of service units to be processed by a service provider (e.g., travel
distance in km). Throughout this paper, we assume that the requested service by any customer can
be met by any of the available service providers. The platform charges each customer a fixed price
rate p per service unit (e.g., dollar per km), and offers a fixed wage rate w per service unit to each
participating service provider. Here, we use “wage rate” per service unit so that the payout ratio
w
p is well defined. We shall compute “earning rate” per unit time later for providers who decide
whether to participate or not.
In the same spirit as in Taylor (2016), the price rate p and wage rate w are pre-committed, but
their values can vary across different time periods depending on the specific market characteristics
such as the average customer demand rate and the expected number of available providers. In
other words, we focus on time-based pricing/wage instead of real-time dynamic pricing/wage that
depends on real-time system status such as the number of customers requesting service and number
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of available providers in real time.1
Each customer decides whether to use the platform to request for service, and each independent
provider decides whether to participate. We assume that the price rate p and wage rate w are known
to the customers and the providers in advance so that they can make their informed decisions. For
each service request, the platform will assign one of the available participating providers to serve
the customer.2 The primary objective of the service platform is to select the optimal price rate and
wage rate, denoted by p∗ and w∗, so as to maximize its average profit.
3.1 Realized customer request rate λ and price rate p
Consider a certain time period (e.g., peak hours from 8am to 10am). The maximum potential
customer demand rate for the service during this time period is given by λ¯, each of which has
a valuation of the service that is based on a value rate v per service unit, where v varies across
customers. To model heterogeneous customers, we assume that there is a continuum of customer
types so that the value rate v spreads over the range [0, 1] according to a cumulative distribution
function F (.), where F (.) is a strictly increasing function with F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1.
For a customer with valuation v and a service request of D units, the customer’s service surplus
is equal to (v − p)D.3 To simplify exposition, we assume that the service units requested D is
independent of the customer type v. (If D and v are dependent, we can still apply our analysis
by treating the random variable vD as the new “valuation”.) As our focus is on the steady state
analysis, it suffices to use the average service units requested by customers in our analysis. Let
d = E(D) denote the average service units requested by customers. To capture the notion of
waiting time sensitivity, we assume that the expected utility function of a customer of value rate
type v is given by
U(v) = (v − p)d− cWq, (1)
1As articulated in MacMillan (2015) and Taylor (2016), many customers resist real time dynamic pricing due
to fairness concerns and most on-demand service providers, other than Uber and Lyft, tend to adopt this form of
time-based pricing.
2Our model does not consider any specific assignment mechanism. For instance, the service platform can assign
an available participating provider based on certain specific criteria (e.g, Uber assigns an available driver closest to
the pickup location), or can announce a service request to all available participating service providers and assign the
request to the first respondent.
3By leveraging internet and mobile technologies, customer requests (e.g., pick up and drop off locations) and the
service operations (e.g., route) can be monitored or controlled by the on-demand platform. As such, we assume
that the number of service units (e.g., travel distance) in each requests is dictated by the customers, and the service
providers cannot manipulate or maximize their earnings by deliberately increasing the service units (e.g., travel
distance) due to information transparency and real-time location tracking capabilities.
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where c denotes the cost of waiting per unit time and Wq represents the expected waiting time for
the service. (For instance, Uber and Lyft provide estimated pick-up time to customers.)
Using (1) and assuming that a rational customer with valuation v will request for service only
if U(v) ≥ 0,4 the platform can use p and w to indirectly control the effective demand (i.e., the
realized customer request rate) λ so that
λ = Prob{U(v) ≥ 0} · λ¯ = Prob{v ≥ p+ c
d
Wq} · λ¯.
Define the “target” service level s = Prob{v ≥ p+ cdWq}. Then, the realized customer request rate
λ is given by:
λ = sλ¯. (2)
Since v ∼ F (.), it follows from (1) that the price rate p satisfies the following equation:
p = F−1(1− λ
λ¯
)− c
d
Wq. (3)
Note that the price rate p decreases in the expected waiting time Wq and the unit waiting cost c.
3.2 Realized number of participating providers k and wage rate w
Let K be the (maximum) number of potential earning sensitive providers who may decide to
participate over the same time period, i.e., K represents the number of registered providers who are
eligible to participate. For any given (p, w), let k be the realized number of providers participating
in the platform, where k ≤ K. Also, let µ denote the average service speed (number of service units
processed per unit time; e.g., travel speed measured in terms of km per hour) of the service providers
so that µ/d represents the service rate of the providers (i.e., average number of customers served
per hour).5 Given the realized customer request rate λ and the realized number of participating
providers k, the utilization of these k participating providers is equal to λk·(µ/d) , where λd < kµ to
ensure system stability. The average wage per unit time of a participating provider (when working)
is equal to the wage per service unit w multiplied by the average service speed µ. Accounting
for the utilization, the average “earning rate” per unit time of a participating provider is equal to
wµ · λdkµ = w λdk .6
4In other words, in equilibrium, only customers with value rate v ≥ p+ c
d
Wq will use the platform to request for
service, and customer requests with value rate v < p+ c
d
Wq will not use the platform to meet their service need.
5If the service units d are already measured in terms of time units, we can simply set µ = 1 in this case.
6For independent service providers, utilization and wage rate are the two key factors for their participation. For
example, DePillis (2016) reported that Uber drivers obtain higher earnings primarily because their utilization rate
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To model the notion of earning-sensitivity, we assume that each potential provider has a reser-
vation earning rate r per unit time (i.e., corresponding to his outside option), where r varies across
different providers. To model the heterogeneity among providers, we assume that there is a con-
tinuum of provider types so that the reservation rate r spreads over the range [0, 1] according to
a cumulative distribution function G(.), where G(.) is a strictly increasing function with G(0) = 0
and G(1) = 1. For a (potential) provider with reservation rate r, he will participate to offer service
only if his average earning rate w λdk is at least equal to r.
Let β denote the proportion of providers who participate in the platform to offer service during
this time period. Then, β = Prob{r ≤ w λdk } = G(w λdk ), and the realized number of participating
providers k (i.e., supply) is given by
k = βK. (4)
Also, in equilibrium, β = G(w λdk ) so that:
G−1(β) = w
λd
k
. (5)
From (4) and (5), we can express the wage rate w as a function of the number of participating
providers k:
w = G−1(β)
k
λd
= G−1(
k
K
)
k
λd
. (6)
3.3 Problem Formulation
Since the platform earns an average profit of (p − w)d for each customer request, the platform’s
average total profit is then equal to pi = λ(p − w)d. By substituting (3) and (6) into the profit
function, we can express the profit function pi as a function of (k, λ) below:
pi(k, λ) = λd
[
F−1(1− λ
λ¯
)− c
d
Wq −G−1( k
K
)
k
λd
]
. (7)
Considering the system stability condition λd < kµ, the optimization problem of the platform can
be formulated as
max
k,λ
pi(k, λ) ≡ λd
[
F−1(1− λ
λ¯
)− c
d
Wq −G−1( k
K
)
k
λd
]
, subject to
λd
kµ
< 1, (8)
(measured in terms of percentage of miles driven with a passenger) is much higher than that for taxi drivers. For
instance, Uber driver’s utilization is 64.2%, while taxi driver’s utilization is only 40.7% in Los Angeles.
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from which we can determine the optimal supply (i.e., the number of participating providers k∗)
and the optimal demand (i.e., the realized customer request rate λ∗). Then, we can use (3) and (6)
to retrieve the corresponding optimal price rate p∗ and optimal wage rate w∗ from k∗ and λ∗.
3.4 Notation
For ease of reference, we list below the basic notation used in the paper.
• K : Maximum number of potential service providers who may opt to participate;
• k : Realized number of participating service providers (k ≤ K);
• λ¯ : Customer demand rate who may opt to use the platform to request for service;
• λ : Realized customer request rate (λ ≤ λ¯);
• s : Target service level;
• D : Random amount of service units per service request;
• d : Average amount of service units per service request, i.e., d = E(D);
• µ : Average service speed of the service providers;
• v : Value rate per service unit of a customer;
• F (.) : Cumulative distribution of value rate of customers v;
• r : Reservation earning rate of service providers;
• G(.) : Cumulative distribution of reservation rate of service providers r;
• c : Unit waiting cost of customers;
• p : Price rate (price per service unit) charged to customers;
• w : Wage rate (wage per service unit) paid to service providers.
4 The Base Model with A Fixed Payout Ratio
A common practice for many on-demand service platforms is to set the wage rate as a fixed propor-
tion of the price rate, i.e., w = αp for some fixed α, 0 < α < 1. For example, Uber set α = 0.8 for
its first cohort of drivers in San Francisco (Huet (2014)). We can use our modeling framework to
analyze this common practice by imposing an additional constraint of w = αp in the optimization
problem as given in (8). We refer to this model as the base model with a fixed payout ratio, or
simply the “base model”, in our subsequent discussions.
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We model the expected waiting time Wq used in the customer’s utility function (1) based on
an M/M/k queue. For an M/M/k queue with arrival rate λ and service rate µd , it is well-known
(see e.g., Gross et al. (2008)) that the expected waiting time is given by
Wq =
1
1 + k!(1−ρ)
kkρk
∑k−1
i=0
kiρi
i!
[
ρ
λ(1− ρ)
]
, (9)
where ρ = λd/kµ represents the system utilization with ρ < 1.
To simplify our analysis here, we shall assume that the distributions of value rate v and reser-
vation earning rate r are uniformly distributed over the range [0,1] so that F (v) = v and G(r) = r
in our models for the rest of this paper. However, all our analytical and numerical results can be
directly extended to the more general case where the positive support of the uniform distribution
of F (.) or G(.) is within the range of [a, b] rather than [0, 1], as used in our illustrative numerical
examples in Section 6.
With the above assumptions, the respective price, wage and profit functions given in (3), (6)
and (7) can be expressed as follows:
p =
(
1− λ
λ¯
)
− c
1 + k!(1−ρ)
kkρk
∑k−1
i=0
kiρi
i!
[
ρ
λd(1− ρ)
]
(10)
w =
k2
Kλd
(11)
pi(k, λ) = λd(p− w) = λd
(1− λλ¯)− c1 + k!(1−ρ)
kkρk
∑k−1
i=0
kiρi
i!
[
ρ
λd(1− ρ)
]
− k
2
Kλd
 , (12)
where the system utilization ρ = λdkµ < 1. Using (10) and (11), the fixed payout ratio constraint,
w = αp, can be written as
k2
Kλd
= α

(
1− λ
λ¯
)
− c
1 + k!(1−ρ)
kkρk
∑k−1
i=0
kiρi
i!
[
ρ
λd(1− ρ)
] ,
or equivalently,
k2 = Kα
λd
(
1− λ
λ¯
)
− c
1 + k!(1−ρ)
kkρk
∑k−1
i=0
kiρi
i!
(
ρ
1− ρ
) . (13)
Also, as w = αp, we can use (11) to rewrite the profit function (12) as
pi(k, λ) = λd(p− w) = λd(w
α
− w) = k
2(1− α)
Kα
. (14)
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Then, the optimization problem is to maximize the profit function (14) subject to the constraints
(13) and k ≤ K. It is easy to see that the optimal k∗ is given by the largest value of k, with k ≤ K,
that possesses a feasible λ to (13).
While it is difficult to derive tractable results using (13), it is straightforward to numerically
search for any feasible λ satisfying (13) for each fixed value of k. For each fixed value of k, with
k = 1, 2, ...,K, we search through all possible values of λ, with λd/kµ < 1, that would satisfy (13).
The optimal solution k∗ is given by the largest value of k with a feasible λ to (13), and the optimal
p∗ and w∗ are given by (10) and (11) accordingly.
The left panel of Table 1 provides a sample set of results in our numerical experiments. For
this set of numerical experiments, we set α = 0.5, c = 1, K = 50, µ = 1, and d = 1 with values of λ¯
ranging from 10 to 100. Table 1 shows that the optimal value of k∗ (and the optimal profit pi∗) is
non-decreasing in λ¯, i.e., the optimal number of participating providers and the optimal expected
profit of the platform would increase (or remain the same) as the customer demand rate who may opt
to use the service increases. However, the optimal values of λ∗ and p∗ are not necessarily monotone
in λ¯.7 In particular, the optimal price could possibly decrease when the customer demand increases.
We shall provide an explanation of why this seemingly counter-intuitive result could occur in our
numerical results later.
Insert Table 1 about here
4.1 An Approximation Scheme
To obtain some analytical results that can enable us to understand why λ∗ and p∗ are not necessarily
monotonic in λ¯, we next develop an approximation scheme by using a simpler function for the
expected waiting time function Wq. The approximation scheme serves two purposes. It gives a
more efficient way of finding a near-optimal solution numerically and provides analytical results for
supporting the insights obtained from our numerical experiments.
Our approximation scheme is motivated by the following well-studied approximation for the
7With the integer constraint on k, there generally exists two feasible values of λ∗ corresponding to the optimal
integer solution k∗. For consistent comparisons, we always present the smaller value of λ∗. The larger value of λ∗
also shows similar non-monotonic property as well.
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expected waiting time of an M/M/k queue with arrival rate λ and service rate µd :
Wq =
ρ
√
2(k+1)
λ(1− ρ) , (15)
where ρ = λdkµ represents the system utilization. The approximation formula (15) is exact for an
M/M/1 queue, i.e., (9) reduces to (15) when k = 1, and it has been shown (see Sakasegawa (1977))
to provide a very good estimate of (9) when k > 1.
However, using (15) for Wq is still too complex for developing tractable results for the base
model. The decision variable k appears in both ρ = λdkµ and the exponent of the expression given
in (15), which makes the first-order conditions of the optimization problem difficult to analyze.
Therefore, we use a simpler approximation for Wq by assuming that:
Wq =
ρ
√
2(n+1)
λ(1− ρ) , (16)
where ρ = λdkµ < 1 and n is some fixed positive number. By using (16) for Wq, the price and profit
functions given in (10) and (12) now become:
p =
(
1− λ
λ¯
)
− cρ
√
2(n+1)
λd(1− ρ) (17)
pi(k, λ) = λd
[
(1− λ
λ¯
)− cρ
√
2(n+1)
λd(1− ρ) −
k2
Kλd
]
, (18)
and the fixed payout ratio constraint given by (13) becomes
k2 = Kα
{
λd
(
1− λ
λ¯
)
− cρ
√
2(n+1)
1− ρ
}
. (19)
Then, for each fixed value of k, we now use (19) instead of (13) to find a feasible λ numerically,
and the optimal solution k∗ is given by the largest value of k, with k ≤ K, that possesses a feasible
λ to (19).
The only difference between (15) and (16) is that the exponent in (15) is based on the decision
variable k, whereas the exponent in (16) is based on a fixed parameter n. Thus, (16) would be
very close to (15) when n is close to k. We next provide an iterative procedure to determine the
parameter n in (16) such that the resulting optimal value of k∗ is equal to n itself. By setting
n = k∗, (16) can be approximated by (15) for k ≈ k∗, and so the approximation (16) would be
close to the exact formula (9) when k ≈ k∗.
An iterative procedure for determining n:
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1. Initialize n = 0.
2. Solve for the optimal k∗(n), and set n = k∗(n).
3. Repeat Step 2 until the values of n and k∗(n) converge.
Note that we allow both n and k∗(n) to be positive numbers rather than positive integers in the
iterative procedure. The next proposition shows that the above iterative procedure will always
converge to a (unique) fixed point, i.e., n∗ = k∗(n∗).
Proposition 1 There exists a unique fixed point n∗ = k∗(n∗), and the iterative procedure always
converges to n∗.
We performed a comprehensive set of numerical experiments to examine the performance of our
approximation scheme using (16) for Wq with n = n
∗. For each numerical example, we find the
fixed point n∗ using the iterative procedure. As the decision variable k is required to be a positive
integer under the exact formula (9), we round n∗ down to the integer below and set k∗ = n = bn∗c,
for comparison purposes. (Rounding up n∗ would give an infeasible solution in our approximation
scheme.)
In our numerical experiments, we set α ∈ [0.4, 0.5, ..., 0.9], c ∈ [0.5, 0.75, 1], K ∈ [50, 60, ..., 150],
µ ∈ [1, 3, 5], λ¯ ∈ [10, 20, ..., 100] and d = 1 for a total of 5940 cases. The right panel of Table 1 pro-
vides the corresponding results for the same set of numerical experiments using our approximation
scheme. Note that the optimal solutions given by the approximation scheme exhibit similar pat-
terns as those using the exact formula; e.g., Table 1 shows that both k∗ and pi∗ are non-decreasing
in λ¯, whereas p∗ and λ∗ are not necessarily monotone in λ¯.
Table 2 summarizes the performance of our approximation scheme, as compared with the re-
sults using the exact formula (9). The numbers in Table 2 represent the mean absolute percent
difference for the optimal values between using the approximation scheme and the exact formula.
For comparison purposes with the exact formula, n∗ is rounded down to an integer due to the in-
tegral constraint on k. Overall, our numerical experiments suggest that the approximation scheme
provides very good approximation results.
Insert Table 2 about here
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We next derive some analytical results for the base model using the approximation formula
(16) for Wq and allowing the decision variable k to take on positive numbers rather than positive
integers only. We can establish the following analytical results under the formal assumptions as
stated below:
Assumption 1: F (.) ∼ U [0, 1], G(.) ∼ U [0, 1], and Wq is given by (16) where n is a fixed positive
number. Also, the decision variable k is not restricted to positive integers only.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and wp = α, 0 < α < 1. Then,
(i) p∗ (and the corresponding w∗ = αp∗), k∗, λ∗ and ρ∗ increase in λ¯; and
(ii) p∗ (and the corresponding w∗ = αp∗), k∗ and ρ∗ increase in d, and λ∗ decreases in d.
We note that the monotonicity results given in Proposition 2 are established for any fixed
positive number n. In our approximation scheme, n is chosen such that n = k∗(n) using the
iterative procedure, which changes as the values of the model parameters change. However, the
monotonicity properties stated in Proposition 2 remain valid for all our numerical results using the
approximation scheme. For instance, our numerical results using the approximation scheme (when
k can take on any positive number) have confirmed that both the optimal price p∗ and realized
customer demand rate λ∗ increase in λ¯, as given in Proposition 2(i).
With the integer constraint on k, the results in Table 1 show that p∗ and λ∗ are not necessarily
monotone in λ¯. We can now explain this non-monotonic behavior of p∗ and λ∗ observed in Table
1 as follows. When k is restricted to be (positive) integers, it is not possible to increase k∗ by
any amount less than one. Consequently, with a small increase in λ¯, k∗ might stay the same, and
the optimal p∗ and λ∗ would then need to be reduced. Without the integer constraint on k, this
behavior will no longer occur. Any increase in λ¯ will cause k∗ to increase, and the resulting p∗ and
λ∗ will always increase, as shown in Proposition 2(i).
4.2 Main Insights
We performed an extensive set of numerical experiments using our approximation scheme (with k
being a continuous variable). Based on these numerical results, together with analytical support of
Proposition 2, we summarize below the main insights for the base model.
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First, the optimal price rate p∗ increases when the customer demand rate λ¯ is higher (or when
the average service unit d is higher). Note that the profit of the platform is equal to the product of
the realized customer request rate λ and the profit margin p(1−α). When λ¯ increases, the platform
can increase its price p∗ while sustaining a higher demand request rate λ∗, resulting in a higher
profit. A higher price rate p∗ also corresponds to a higher wage rate (as w∗ = αp∗), which attracts
more participating providers k∗ to handle the higher demand request rate λ∗. Thus, our results
suggest that an on-demand ride-hailing service platform using a fixed payout ratio should charge a
higher price to increase profitability during rush hours when the customer demand is high.
Second, while a higher customer demand rate λ¯ (or a higher d) would increase the optimal price
rate p∗ and wage rate w∗, the optimal price and wage rates are not necessarily monotone as service
capacity increases (with a higher K or µ). We can explain this contrast as follows. When the
number of available providers K (or service rate µ) increases, the platform can decrease its wage
rate w∗ while still attracting more participating providers k∗. Also, the corresponding decrease in
price rate p∗ would increase the realized demand request rate λ∗ as its capacity increases. However,
this does not necessarily increase the profit as the profit margin p∗(1 − α) would reduce. Overall,
the optimal price p∗ is not monotonic in K, but depends on the relative changes in demand request
rate λ∗ and profit margin p∗(1− α).
Similarly, the optimal price and wage rates are not necessarily monotonic in the unit waiting
cost c. As c increases, a direct effect is a decrease in demand request rate, and the platform needs
to adjust its price rate (and the corresponding wage rate) to reduce the adverse effect of a higher
waiting cost. If the platform increases its wage rate w to attract more participating providers to
reduce waiting time, the corresponding price increase p∗ would further reduce demand request rate
λ and possibly lead to a lower profit. On the other hand, if the platform reduces its price rate p to
stimulate demand request rate λ, the corresponding reduction in wage rate w would reduce supply
capacity k and profit margin p∗(1− α). Therefore, the impact of c on the optimal price and wage
rates are not necessarily monotonic, but depends on specific values of the model parameters.
5 The General Model with A Time-based Payout Ratio
Our base model is based on the situation where the platform uses a fixed payout ratio for its service
providers. While a fixed ratio payout scheme is easy to implement and widely adopted in practice,
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it raises an interesting question of whether a time-based payout ratio that depends on specific time-
based market characteristics could significantly improve the profitability of an on-demand service
platform. To answer this question, we now analyze the general situation where the optimal price
and wage rates are determined without imposing the constraint of w = αp in solving the decision
problem of the platform. We refer to this model as the general model with a time-based payout
ratio, or simply the “general model”, in our subsequent discussions.
For the general model, the decision problem is to find the optimal values (k, λ) that maximize
the profit function pi(k, λ) given in (12) subject to the utilization constraint ρ = λdkµ < 1. As for the
base model, the profit function (12) is too complex for conducting tractable analysis, but we can
solve the problem numerically. Specifically, we can perform an exhaustive numerical search for the
optimal λ that maximizes (12) for each fixed value of k, k = 1, 2, ...,K, and we then compare the
optimal profit for each value of k to select the optimal k∗ and the corresponding optimal λ∗.
The left panel of Table 3 provides the results for the same set of numerical experiments as
given in Table 1. Table 3 shows that k∗ and pi∗ for the general model are also non-decreasing in
λ¯, i.e., both the optimal number of participating providers and the optimal expected profit of the
platform increase (or remain the same) as the customer demand rate increases. Furthermore, p∗
and w∗ generally (but not always) increase in λ¯, i.e., the platform would most likely increase price
and wage rates when the customer demand rate increases.
Insert Table 3 about here
We next illustrate in Table 4 how the optimal expected profit would be affected if the platform
uses a fixed payout ratio instead of the optimal time-based payout ratio. By using the parameters
associated with the numerical experiments discussed above, we conduct the following analysis. For
a given λ¯, we compute the ratio (in percentage) between the expected profit under a fixed payout
ratio α (value is given in the first row) and the expected profit under the optimal time-based ratio
α∗ (value is given in the second column). The results in Table 4 show that the expected profit can
be greatly reduced if α is substantially different from α∗. For example, when λ¯ = 10, the platform
can only obtain 31% of the expected profit under the optimal time-based payout ratio α∗ = .35 if
a fixed payout ratio α = .8 is used.
Insert Table 4 about here
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Table 5 provides the values of the optimal time-based payout ratio α∗ for the above set of
numerical experiments with λ¯ ranging from 10 to 100 and K ranging from 10 to 100. Observe
that the optimal dynamic payout ratio α∗ can vary widely depending on the specific values of the
model parameters. Thus, the combined results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that, when the operating
characteristics (such as λ¯ or K) can change significantly at different time periods, it is not possible
to choose one single fixed payout ratio that would be close to the optimal payout ratios across
all time periods. Consequently, the platform using a fixed payout ratio scheme can achieve near-
optimal results for only certain time periods. Instead, the platform needs to adopt a time-based
payout ratio scheme to maximize profitability across different time periods.
Insert Table 5 about here
5.1 An Approximation Scheme
We can use (16) for Wq to develop a similar approximation scheme for finding near-optimal solutions
for the general model in which the price and profit functions are given by (17) and (18), respectively.
In this case, the optimal (k∗, λ∗) can be obtained from the following two first-order conditions:
∂pi
∂k
= cµ
ρ
√
2(n+1)
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
− 2k
K
= 0 (20)
∂pi
∂λ
= d
{(
1− 2λ
λ¯
)
− cρ
√
2(n+1)−1
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)}
= 0. (21)
For each fixed value of n, we can use the two first-order conditions (20) and (21) to find the optimal
values of (k, λ), as denoted by (k∗(n), λ∗(n)). We can also use an iterative procedure to select the
parameter n given in (16) such that the resulting optimal value of k∗(n) is equal to n itself.
We can establish the following result under the approximation scheme for the general model:
Proposition 3 There exists a unique fixed point n∗ = k∗(n∗) for the general model.
We can use a simple bisection search to find the unique fixed point n∗ as follows:
1. Initialize l = 0 and u = K.
2. Set n = l+u2 and solve for the optimal k
∗(n). If k∗(n) > n, set l = n; otherwise set u = n.
3. Repeat Step 2 until the values of n and k∗(n) converge.
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We also performed numerical experiments to evaluate the performance of the approximation
scheme by comparing the optimal solutions with those using the exact formula (9) for Wq. For
consistent comparisons, we also restricted k to positive integers under the approximation scheme
by rounding up the value of n∗ obtained from the iterative procedure, i.e., n = dn∗e. We then set
the optimal k∗ = n and use the first-order condition (21) with k = k∗ to find the corresponding
optimal λ∗.
In our numerical experiments, we set c ∈ [0.5, 0.6, ..., 1], K ∈ [50, 60, ..., 150], µ ∈ [1, 2, ..., 10],
λ¯ ∈ [10, 20, ..., 100] and d = 1 for a total of 6600 cases. The right panel of Table 3 provides the
corresponding results for the same set of numerical experiments discussed earlier for the base model.
Observe that while k∗ under the exact formula (9) and approximation (16) are slightly different in
some cases (e.g., λ¯ = 40), λ∗ is adjusted accordingly to achieve near-optimal profit. Also, p∗ and
w∗ are mostly (though still not always) increasing in λ¯.
Table 6 summarizes the performance of our approximation scheme for the general model, as
compared with the results using the exact formula (9). The numbers in Table 6 represent the
mean absolute percent difference for the optimal values between using the approximation scheme
and the exact formula. Overall, our numerical experiments suggest that the approximation scheme
provides very good approximation results, even when k∗ is relatively small (i.e., k∗ > 10). Thus,
our numerical results show that our approximation scheme could provide near-optimal results for
most service platforms in practice.
Insert Table 6 about here
We can also establish the following monotonicity results for the general model using approxi-
mation (16) for Wq.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1, the optimal solution for the general model exhibits the fol-
lowing characteristics:
(i) When K or µ increases, w∗ decreases, pi∗ increases, but p∗ is not necessarily monotonic.
(ii) When c increases, w∗ increases, pi∗ decreases, but p∗ is not necessarily monotonic.
(iii) When λ¯ or d increases, w∗, p∗ and pi∗ increase.
(iv) The optimal payout ratio α∗ = w
∗
p∗ decreases in K and µ, and increases in c, λ¯ and d.
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It is important to observe from Proposition 4 that, even though the optimal price rate is not
necessarily monotonic in K, µ and c, the optimal time-based payout ratio α∗ is monotone in all
model parameters. In particular, the optimal time-based payout ratio α∗ decreases when the service
capacity increases (with a higher K or µ), but increases when the waiting cost c is higher or when
customer demand increases (with a higher λ¯ or d).
As shown in the proof of Proposition 4, we also obtain monotonicity properties for other system
performance measures as summarized in Table 7. The monotonicity properties given in Proposition
4 and Table 7 are established for a fixed value of n, whereas the value of n used in (16) in our
approximation scheme changes as the values of the model parameters change. We also performed
numerical experiments to validate these properties for the optimal solutions using our approxima-
tion scheme. Results from all our numerical experiments are consistent with the analytical results
given in Proposition 4. For example, Table 8 provides the optimal values of α∗ for the numerical
experiments discussed earlier, which is consistent with Proposition 4(iv) that α∗ generally decreases
in K and increases in λ¯. Consequently, Proposition 4(iv) provides analytical support that the op-
timal time-based payout ratio α∗ generally decreases in K and increases in λ¯, as observed in Table
5 using the exact formula (9) and in Table 8 using the approximation scheme.
Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here
Proposition 4 shows the impact on the optimal wage, time-based payout ratio and the profit of
the platform when either the number of providers K or the customer demand rate λ¯ increases. As
a platform grows, it is common that both K and λ¯ would increase at the same time. Therefore, it
would be useful to understand how these optimal results would change as both K and λ¯ increase.
It is clear from Proposition 4 that the optimal profit of the platform would increase when both K
and λ¯ increase. However, it is unclear as how the platform would adjust its wage and price rates as
well as its payout ratio as the platform grows, as both the optimal wage rate w∗ and the optimal
payout ratio α∗ would change in opposite directions with respect to the changes in K and λ¯.
It is intuitive that the changes in the optimal wage rate, price rate and payout ratio would
generally depend on the relative growth rates of the number of providers K and customer demand
rate λ¯. However, we can derive the following results for the special case when K and λ¯ increase
at the same rate. Specifically, suppose that the initial number of providers and customer demand
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rate are given by Kˆ and λˆ, respectively. Let  > 1 represent the (same) growth rate of number of
providers and customer demand rate, i.e., K = Kˆ and λ¯ = λˆ. The following proposition shows
the effect of  on the optimal wage and price rates, and the optimal payout ratio.
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 1, both w∗ and α∗ = w
∗
p∗ decrease as  increases. However, p
∗
is not necessarily monotonic in .
Proposition 5 shows that, under Assumption 1, a platform should lower its wage rate and
payout ratio as both the number of providers and customer demand rate grow at the same rate.
We further performed some numerical experiments to confirm these monotonicity results using
our approximation scheme n = k∗(n). Table 9 provides some sample results of our numerical
experiments that also illustrate the monotonicity results. For this set of numerical examples, we
set Kˆ = λˆ = 10, c = 1, µ = 1 and d = 1, with  increasing from 1 to 5. Observe that both w∗ and
α∗ decreases as  increases, as supported by the analytical results of Proposition 5.
Insert Table 9 about here
5.2 Main Insights
Based on our numerical experiments, together with analytical support from Propositions 4 and 5
and Table 7, we summarize the main insights for the general model below.
First, the platform should reduce the wage rate w∗ as the number of available providers K (or
average service speed µ) increases. In addition, the optimal profit pi∗ increases as K or µ increases,
which implies that it is beneficial for the platform to recruit more providers to join the platform
and to help providers increase their average service speed. However, the optimal price p∗ is not
necessarily monotonic in K.8 Our numerical results suggest that the optimal price could first
increase and then decrease in K, and we can explain this behavior using the well-known “queueing
effect” that the expected waiting time increases convexly in the system utilization as follows.
When K is small (relative to the customer demand rate λ¯), the constraint is on the supply side,
and the platform needs to operate in high utilization. In this case, an increase in supply capacity
from a higher K can significantly reduce the waiting time Wq (due to the non-linear queueing
8For a numerical example using the exact formula (9), set c = 5, µ = 1, λ¯ = 500 and d = 1. The optimal price p∗
increases as K increases from 50 to 70, but then decreases as K increases further from 70 to 150.
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effect), so the platform can afford to increase the optimal price p∗ to maintain a higher realized
customer request rate λ∗ and achieve a higher profit pi∗. This explains why the optimal price p∗
could initially increase in K when K is small. On the other hand, when K is large, the constraint is
now on the demand side, and the system can operate in lower utilization. In this case, an increase in
K would only reduce the waiting time Wq slightly (due to the non-linear queueing effect), and the
platform now chooses to reduce the optimal price p∗ in order to stimulate a higher customer request
rate λ∗ and achieve a higher profit pi∗. This explains why the optimal price p∗ would decrease in
K when K is large. Overall, we show that the queueing effect has caused the optimal price p∗ to
be non-monotonic in K.
Our results show that the optimal price and the optimal wage may move in the same direction or
opposite direction when the maximum number of service providers increases. This non-monotonic
property of the optimal price in our model is apparently due to the fact that our model captures
the nonlinear effect of utilization on waiting time. When the queueing effect on customer demand
is not captured in our model (i.e., c = 0), it is straightforward to show that both p∗ and w∗ decrease
in K, which provides a further justification that the non-monotonic property in the optimal price
rate is due to the queueing effect captured in the customer utility function (1) of our model.9
Second, we find that the platform should offer a higher wage rate w∗ as the waiting cost c
increases. This helps to attract more providers k∗ to participate, but will reduce the optimal
profit of the platform pi∗. However, the optimal price p∗ is not necessarily monotonic in c.10 Our
numerical results suggest that the optimal price p∗ could first increase in c when c is small, but
then decrease in c as c increases. This non-monotonic behavior can be again explained by how the
queueing effect captured in our model.
When c is small (relative to the price p), the platform can operate in high utilization (with few
providers) since customers are less sensitive to waiting time than price. In this case, an increase in
c would reduce demand and decrease waiting time significantly at high utilization (due to the non-
linear queueing effect). Consequently, the platform can take advantage of the significant waiting
time reduction by increasing the optimal price p∗ to maximize its profit. On the other hand, when
9When the profit function is not a multiplicative form of demand and supply, Hu and Zhou (2017) show that the
optimal price has a U-shape relationship with the exogenous wage when the profit function of the platform is the
minimum of demand and supply.
10For a numerical example using the exact formula (9), set K = 50, µ = 1, λ¯ = 50, d = 1. The optimal price p∗
first increases as c increases from 10 to 80, but then decreases as c increases further from 80 to 100.
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c is large, customers are now more sensitive to waiting time than price, and the platform now needs
to operate at lower utilization. In this case, an increase in c would reduce demand, but would
provide only marginal waiting time reduction (due to the non-linear queueing effect). As a result,
the platform would now choose to reduce the optimal price p∗ in order to stimulate the customer
request rate λ∗ to maximize its profit. This explains why the optimal price p∗ would decrease in
c when c is large. Overall, we explain that the non-linear queueing effect has caused the optimal
price p∗ to be non-monotonic in c
Third, the platform should increase its price rate p∗ as customer demand rate λ¯ (or average
service units d) increases. At the same time, the platform should also increase its wage rate w∗in
order to attract more participating providers k∗ to handle the higher customer request rate λ∗.
Overall, the profit of the platform pi∗ increases as λ¯ (or d) increases.
Finally, the platform should reduce its payout ratio α∗ when the service capacity (i.e., a higher
K or µ) increases. This implies that the platform can lower its payout ratio as it attracts more
providers to the platform. Also, the platform should increase the payout ratio when the customer
waiting cost c is higher or when customer demand increases (i.e., a higher λ¯ or d). One interesting
implication of this result is that an on-demand ride-hailing service platform should increase the
payout ratio to its participating drivers during rush hours when the customer demand rate λ¯ is
higher and/or the travel speed µ is lower. More interestingly, the platform should also reduce its
payout ratio as it expands with the number of providers and customer demand growing at about
the same rate. This result could provide an economic justification for Uber’s strategy as reported
by Huet (2014) of offering a payout ratio of 0.8 for its first cohorts of drivers in San Francisco
initially, but lowering its payout ratio to 0.75 for its second cohorts of drivers in 2014, as both the
number of registered drivers and customer demand rate had increased.
5.3 Extension to include consumer and provider surplus
Besides profit, the platform may have an interest in managing the welfare of its customers and
providers carefully, especially when the practices of some on-demand service platforms could be
potentially controversial. For example, Uber has been challenged by consumer rights group due to
concerns about public safety including sexual assaults, physical attacks, by independent drivers due
to their concerns about being treated as regular employees without benefits, by the government due
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to concerns over regulations, and by other taxi drivers due to their concerns over unfair competition;
see Rogers (2015) for a comprehensive list of social costs of Uber including public safety, privacy,
discrimination, and labor law violations. Our general model can be extended to incorporate the
welfare of the consumers and providers to help address these concerns.
In the same spirit as Cachon et al. (2015), we can extend the objective of our general model
to maximize the firm’s profit plus the total consumer and provider surplus. For a customer who
requests for service with a value rate of v ≥ F−1(1− λ
λ¯
), her surplus is given by {(v − p)d− cWq}.
Therefore, the total customer surplus is equal to
Cs = λ¯
∫ 1
F−1(1−λ
λ¯
)
[(v − p)d− cWq] dF (v) = λ¯
[(∫ 1
F−1(1−λ
λ¯
)
v dF (v)− λ
λ¯
p
)
d− λ
λ¯
cWq
]
. (22)
For a participating provider with a wage reservation rate of r ≤ w λdk , his surplus is given by w λdk −r.
Therefore, the total provider surplus is equal to
Ps = K
∫ G−1( k
K
)
0
(
w
λd
k
− r
)
dG(r) = wλd−G−1( k
K
)k +K
∫ G−1( k
K
)
0
G(r)dr. (23)
Thus, the objective function of the platform for the general model can be expressed as
Π(k, λ) =(1− γ)pi(k, λ) + γ(Cs + Ps)
=(1− γ)pi(k, λ) + γ
{
λ¯
[(∫ 1
F−1(1−λ
λ¯
)
v dF (v)− λ
λ¯
p
)
d− λ
λ¯
cWq
]
+ wλd−G−1( k
K
)k
+K
∫ G−1( k
K
)
0
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}
=(1− γ)pi(k, λ) + γ
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λ¯d
[∫ 1
F−1(1−λ
λ¯
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λ¯
F−1(1− λ
λ¯
)
]
+K
∫ G−1( k
K
)
0
G(r)dr
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,
(24)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the “equitable payoff” parameter which represents the willingness of the platform
to give up some of its profit for a more equitable (or fairer) outcome for its customers and providers
in setting price and wage rates; see Cui et al. (2007). For example, when γ = 12 , the platform
assigns equal weights on its profit and the total consumer and provider surplus. When γ = 0, the
platform completely ignores the consumer and provider surplus, and Π(k, λ) simply reduces to the
profit function pi(k, λ) as given in (7).
For this extension, the decision problem is to determine the optimal values of (k, λ) that max-
imize the total welfare function Π(k, λ) subject to the system stability constraint of ρ = λdkµ < 1.
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We can follow the same approach to analyze the general model for this extension. In particular,
we can establish the following results:
Proposition 6 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and γ ≤ 23 . When the platform maximizes the
total welfare function (24), the optimal solution exhibits the following characteristics:
(i) All results as stated in Propositions 4 and 5 continue to hold.
(ii) When γ increases, the optimal wage rate w∗ increases (and both k∗ and λ∗ increase), but the
optimal price rate p∗ is not necessarily monotonic.
Proposition 6(i) shows that our results for the general model are robust even when we include
the total customer and provider surplus in the objective function as long as γ ≤ 23 . Proposition 6(ii)
further shows that when a higher weight γ is placed on the total consumer and provider surplus,
the platform would increase the wage rate w∗ to attract more participating providers k∗ and serve
more customers λ∗. However, the optimal price p∗ is not necessarily monotonic as γ increases.
We also conducted numerical experiments to illustrate the results for the extension of the general
model using the exact formula (9) for Wq. Table 10 shows the results for the case with the same set
of experiments given in Table 3 (with λ¯ = 100) for different values of γ. Observe that as γ increases,
the optimal wage rate w∗ increases (as supported by Proposition 6), and the optimal wage rate p∗
decreases (although Proposition 6 suggests that it is not necessarily monotonic in general). Also,
as γ increases, the optimal payout ratio α∗ increases, the platform’s profit decreases and the total
consumer and provider surplus increases. When the platform puts a larger weight on the total
consumer and provider surplus than its profit (i.e., γ ≥ 0.5), the optimal payout ratio α∗ exceeds
one, which implies that the platform is willing to increase the total consumer and provider surplus
at the expense of a profit loss. This observation suggests that the platform needs to select a low
“equitable payoff” γ to be financially viable in the long run, while an emerging service platform
might adopt the strategy of placing a higher weight on the welfare of the consumers and providers
initially in order to increase market share; e.g., this strategy was used by Didi during its early stage
of competition with taxis and other ride-hailing firms.
Insert Table 10 about here
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6 Numerical Illustrations Based on Didi Data
6.1 Background information
To calibrate our model parameters, we collected real data from Didi, the largest on-demand ride-
hailing service platform in China that was founded in June 2012.11 Our data was based on rides
that took place in Hangzhou, the capital city of Zhejiang province with an urban population of
over 7 millions, during the time periods between September 7-13 and November 1-30 in 2015.
In Hangzhou city, Didi offers different types of services including Taxi (traditional taxi service),
Express/Private (equivalent to UBER X/Black with on-demand drivers), and Hitch (equivalent
to UBER Pool)12. For our numerical illustrations here, we focus on the data associated with the
Express/Private service, which accounts for 60% of all rides provided by Didi in Hangzhou. Didi
had approximately 13,000 registered drivers for all services in Hangzhou, but the exact number of
Express/Private drivers was not known to us. So, we simply assume that 60% of Didi drivers were
Express/Private drivers so that the number of registered Express/Private drivers in Hangzhou was
assumed to be around 7, 800.
6.2 Number of rides and drivers across different hours
Figure 1 depicts the average number of Express/Private rides and drivers across different hours on
any given day. (Here, Hour 8 represents one-hour interval 8am-9am, Hour 19 for 7pm- 8pm, and
so on. Data for Hours 1-7 were omitted due to incomplete data in the database.) We observe from
the Didi data that the pattern depicted in Figure 1 is consistent throughout the weekdays (even
though the average number of rides and drivers were slightly lower on Saturdays and Sunday) and
that the peak hours are being Hours 9 and 19, and the slowest hours are being Hours 23 and 24.
For instance, during the peak Hour 19, there were an average of 1,211 drivers and an average of
2,006 Express/Private rides in a weekday. However, there were only an average of 597 drivers and
an average of 1,029 rides during the late night Hour 23. (The mean and standard deviation of the
number of drivers and number of rides over the weekdays are provided in the Appendix B.)
11http://www.xiaojukeji.com/en/company.html. Didi merged with Kuaidi (a major competitor) in February 2015
as a way to defend its market share when Uber officially launched its service in China in July 2014. In August 2016,
Uber decided to retreat from China and its China operations merged with Didi.
12Unlike Uber’s business model that aims to displace the traditional taxi services, Didi integrates taxi services into
its business model by providing its mobile hailing service to taxi drivers free of charge. Chen et al. (2017) have
recently used the data provided by Didi to analyze ridesplitting behavior of passengers using on-demand ride-hailing
services.
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6.3 Travel distance and travel speed
While the average number of rides and drivers vary substantially across different hours of the day,
Figure 2 shows that the average travel distance for each Express/Private ride was rather stable
across different hours. For example, the average travel distance d during the peak Hour 19 and
during the late night Hour 23 were 6.3 km and 6.6 km, respectively. The Didi database also provided
the average travel times µ across different hours from which we can estimate the average travel
speed across different hours. For example, we estimated that the average travel speeds were about
19 km/hour for Hour 19 and 26 km/hour for Hour 23. These numbers are consistent with the actual
expected traffic conditions, where traffic is much less congested during late night hours. (The travel
distance and travel time distributions across different hours are provided in the Appendix B.)
6.4 Price and wage rates
Didi’s price p for its service consists of two components so that p = p1 + p2, where p1 represents
the fare that is primarily based on the travel distance, and p2 represents surcharges (e.g., tolls).
Accordingly, Didi paid its drivers based on the following scheme. When a passenger pays a total fee
of p, the driver receives (p1 ∗80%−0.5)∗(100%−1.77%)+p2 ∗(100%−1.77%), but the driver needs
to cover the surcharges p2. Thus, the actual wage that Didi paid its drivers was approximately 80%
of the total price; i.e., w ≈ 0.8p.
Figure 2 also shows that the average price per km charged by Didi (excluding the surcharges)
was relatively stable across different hours of the day. Overall, the price per km had a mean of
3.07 RMB and a standard deviation of 1.45 RMB. In particular, the average prices per km charged
were RMB 3.13 for Hour 19 (peak hour) and RMB 2.76 for Hour 23 (non-peak hour). We also
observe from the Didi data that the average price per km p was highly correlated with the number
of rides λ over the peak (non-peak) hours, with a correlation coefficient of 0.81. In other words,
the price per km was usually higher during peak hours when the customer request rate is high, and
was lower during non-peak hours when the customer request rate is low. This pricing pattern is
consistent with the results obtained from our base model (see Proposition 2) that p∗ increases as
λ¯ increases. (The mean and standard deviation of the average price per km across different hours
are provided in the Appendix B.)
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6.5 Strategic factors and their implications
It is important to note that the observed price that Didi charged its passengers was heavily dis-
counted during the data collection periods for two strategic reasons: (a) Didi wanted to attract more
passengers by pricing its service below the traditional taxi services;13 and (b) Didi was engaged in
a price war with Uber by offering discount coupons to compete for market share. In addition to
offering heavily discounted price to attract passengers, Didi also provided extra “side payments” to
its drivers to entice drivers to join its platform due to the intense market competition. For instance,
Didi had offered an extra bonus if the number of rides provided by a driver exceeds a certain quota
within a 7-day period. BBC (2016) had reported that the extra payment can be as high as 110%
of the fare paid by the passengers. With such generous payments, more drivers reported to work
and Didi did not need to use surge pricing during peak hours, which explains why Didi was able
to offer relatively stable pricing in Hangzhou as depicted in Figure 2. Furthermore, the waiting
time for Didi’s service was reasonably short with an adequate supply of drivers. Specifically, the
average waiting time of all Express/Private rides over the aforementioned time periods was about
6 minutes, of which the waiting time for accepting a ride request was approximately 1 minute and
the waiting time for picking up a passenger was approximately 5 minutes.
In view of the heavily discounted price due to the above strategic reasons, the average price
per km p as reported in Figure 2 was biased and did not accurately represent the regular prices p
that the firm should quote and the actual wages w should offer in equilibrium. Nevertheless, we
use the data given in the Didi database to calibrate our model parameters for constructing realistic
numerical examples to illustrate some of our model results.
6.6 Numerical examples for illustrative purposes
We next provide some numerical results using parameter values calibrated from the Didi data. As
Hangzhou is a large urban area of over 5, 000 km2, it is not possible to assign any available driver to
serve a call request due to a long pickup time. Instead, only nearby drivers can be used to serve a
local request. For simplicity, we assume that the city is divided into 20 zones with equal passenger
and driver distributions such that only drivers and riders within the same zone would be matched.
13In Hangzhou, taxi charges RMB 11 initially and then RMB 2.6 per km. As a way to entice passengers to choose
Didi over taxi service, Didi had priced its service below taxi rates to increase market share. Based on our discussions
with passengers in China, there was an expectation that Didi’s price rate was lower than the taxi rate.
30
As such, we simply re-scale the demand and number of available drivers by a factor of 20 and set
the maximum number of drivers K = 7, 800/20 = 390.
We examine the average income for taxi drivers in Hangzhou and the average major out-of-
pocket expenses borne by the Didi drivers (including car insurance, license, fuel cost, etc.). We
estimate that a minimum hourly wage of RMB 30 is required for a Didi driver to offer service.
Thus, the hourly wage reservation r is assumed to be distributed uniformly between RMB 30 to
RMB 40.
As discussed earlier, the data were collected during the time when Didi was offering large fare
discounts to attract riders such that riders expected that Didi price wound be around or even less
than the taxi rate of RMB 2.6 per km in Hangzhou. Thus, we use the taxi rate as a benchmark
and assume that the customer value per km v is distributed uniformly between RMB 2 to RMB 4.
As shown in Figure 2, the average travel distances did not vary significantly across hours, so we
simply set the average travel distance d = 6 km across all hours. It is difficult to provide an accurate
estimate of the waiting cost per hour c. Gomez-Ibanez et al. (1999) reported that the waiting cost
for a working class passenger in San Francisco is approximately 195% of the passenger’s after-tax
wages. Using this estimate and the fact that the average hourly wage of workers in Hangzhou is
approximately RMB 40 per hour (China Daily, 2016), one can argue that the waiting cost for an
average passenger in Hangzhou is approximately RMB 80 per hour. Accounting for the income
inequality and the impatient characteristics of most city dwellers in China (Li (2016)), we simply
choose the range of c from RMB 0 to RMB 1,000.
We use data from two specific time periods to illustrate our model results. In particular, we
use Hour 19 to represent peak-hour characteristics with high demand and travel congestion levels,
and Hour 23 to represent non-peak hour characteristics with lower demand and congestion levels.
For Hour 19, we set the average customer demand rate λ¯ = 200 with an average service speed µ =
19 km/hour so that the average demand request rate is equal to 100 (≈ 1969/20) when the price
rate is equal to RMB 3 to match the Didi data. For Hour 23, we set λ¯ = 100 and µ = 26 km/hour
such that the average request rate is equal to 50 (≈ 1033/20) when the price rate is equal to RMB
3. We summarize the parameter values used in our illustrative examples in Table 11.
Insert Table 11 about here
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In each numerical experiment, we solve for the optimal price and wage rates numerically for
the general model using the exact formula (9) for Wq. Figures 3 and 4 show the optimal number
of participating drivers k∗ (in each zone), price rate p∗ and wage rate w∗ for the peak hour and
non-peak hour scenarios, respectively, as the waiting cost c increases from 0 to 1, 000. Observe that
w∗ increase as c increases in both Figures 3 and 4, and that k∗ (scale on the left), p∗ and w∗ (scale
on the right) are all higher during the peak hour (Figure 3) than those during the non-peak hour
(Figure 4), which are intuitive as the peak hour period has a higher customer demand rate λ¯ and
a slower service speed µ than that during non-peak hour period. Also, k∗ increases and p∗ slightly
increases as c increases.
Figure 5 shows that the optimal payout ratio α∗ increases from 0.57 to 0.78 for the peak hour
scenario and increases from 0.45 to 0.70 for the non-peak hour scenario, respectively, as c increases
from 0 to 1, 000. Observe that the optimal payout ratio is always higher during the peak hour
than that during the non-peak hour. As the optimal payout ratio α∗ increases significantly when
c increases, this suggests that a fixed payout ratio would not perform well across different time
periods. To illustrate, Figure 6 shows the result for the peak hour scenario (Hour 19) that using
the optimal time-based payout ratio α∗ can substantially increase the profit of from using a fixed
payout ratio of 0.8, especially when c is small in which α∗ is much lower than 0.8. In particular,
when c = 0 (i.e., ignoring waiting cost), the optimal profit is equal to 843 with optimal payout
ratio α∗ = 0.57, as compared with an optimal profit of 479 with a fixed payout ratio of 0.8. Thus,
our numerical results suggest that the platform should deploy a time-based payout ratio scheme to
achieve a much higher profit across all time periods, especially when the waiting cost c is small.
7 Conclusion
Motivated by the increasing popularity of on-demand service platforms with independent service
providers and time sensitive customers, we develop an analytical framework to understand how such
platforms should set their optimal price and wage to match the needs of providers and customers
taking into account the underlying supply and demand characteristics. Our framework incorpo-
rates waiting time performance based on a queueing model in customer utility and captures some
important market characteristics including time sensitive customers and earning sensitive service
providers. We conduct extensive numerical experiments to illustrate the behavior of the optimal
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price and wage rates as predicted by our modeling framework. We further derive analytical results
to support the main insights observed in our numerical experiments. Our findings provide some
interesting implications in managing prices and wages for on-demand service platforms.
Using some actual data collected from a major on-demand ride-hailing company in China, we
calibrate our model parameters to construct realistic numerical examples to illustrate some impli-
cations on the optimal price and wage with respect to the underlying operating characteristics.
Although our framework does not capture certain important practical issues due to intense compe-
tition existed in China when the data were collected (and thus cannot be used to accurately predict
the actual behavior of the players in the market), our model results can help to illustrate and
explain some observations that are consistent with the actual data provided by the company. More
importantly, our model results can serve as a guideline for potentially increasing profitability when
the underlying market conditions were to evolve to be consistent with the operating environment
captured in our modeling framework. We also illustrate the potential benefits if the company were
to adopt a time-based payout ratio versus their current practice of using a fixed payout ratio.
Our results are obtained under the assumption that the customer’s valuation of the service and
the provider’s earning reservation are uniformly distributed. We also conducted some numerical
experiments using exponential distributions for both the customer’s valuation of the service and the
provider’s earning reservation, and the results are consistent with those under uniform distributions.
However, a comprehensive numerical study is needed to confirm the robustness of our results under
more general distributions.
Our model considers price and wage rates that are pre-committed, and we analyze the equilib-
rium behavior of the system. One future research direction is to study dynamic pricing strategies
in which the platform can offer dynamic prices and wages to customers and providers based on the
real-time status of the system. Specifically, one can develop a modeling framework that considers
the real-time interactions among the customers, providers and the platform where the customers
and providers need to make real-time decisions on whether to accept the dynamic prices and wages
offered by the service platform. Another possible future research direction is to study platform
competition so as to characterize the optimal demand-contingent price and wage strategies in a
competitive setting.
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Appendix
A Mathematical Proofs:
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
When k∗ < K, it is clear that the right hand of (19) is increasing in n for any given fixed parameter
values. Since the optimal k is obtained by maximizing k subject to (19), we can conclude that k∗
increases in n, i.e., ∂k
∗
∂n > 0. We next show that k
∗ is concave in n, i.e., ∂
2k∗
∂n2
< 0.
Let y = cρ
√
2(n+1)
1−ρ . Since s =
λ
λ¯
, we can rewrite (19) as
k2 = Kα{sλ¯d(1− s)− y}.
Taking the derivative with respect to n on both sides, we obtain
2k
∂k
∂n
= Kα
[
λ¯d(1− 2s) ∂s
∂n
− ∂y
∂s
∂s
∂n
− ∂y
∂k
∂k
∂n
− ∂y
∂n
]
(25)
Also,
∂y
∂s
= λ¯dc
ρ
√
2(n+1)−1
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
,
from which we can use (30) to deduce that
∂y
∂s
= λ¯d(1− 2s). (26)
We substitute (26) into (25) to obtain
(2k +Kα
∂y
∂k
)
∂k
∂n
= −Kα∂y
∂n
.
It is straightforward to show that ∂y∂n < 0. Since
∂k
∂n > 0, we have
2k +Kα
∂y
∂k
> 0. (27)
We next take the derivative of (25) with respect to n and obtain
2(
∂k
∂n
)2+2k
∂2k
∂n2
= Kα
[
−2λ¯d( ∂s
∂n
)2 + λ¯d(1− 2s) ∂
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)2 − ∂
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− ∂
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.
We substitute (26) into the above equation to obtain
(2k +Kα
∂y
∂k
)
∂2k
∂n2
= Kα
[
−2λ¯d( ∂s
∂n
)2 − ∂
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∂s2
(
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)2 − ∂
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(
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]
− 2(∂k
∂n
)2. (28)
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It is straighforward to verify that ∂
2y
∂s2
> 0, ∂
2y
∂k2
> 0 and ∂
2y
∂n2
> 0, which implies that the right side
of (28) is less than zero. Using (27), we can conclude that ∂
2k
∂n2
< 0.
Clearly, we have k∗(0) > 0 when n = 0. Also, k∗(n) ≤ K for all n, as k∗(n) is given by the
largest value of k, with k ≤ K, that possesses a feasible λ to (19). Thus, k∗(K) ≤ K. Since we
have shown that k∗ is concave and increasing in n, we can conclude that there exists one unique
fixed point such that k∗(n∗) = n∗, and the iterative procedure will always converge to n∗.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
With the constraint that wp = α, the objective function can be expressed as pi = λd(p − w) =
λd( 1α − 1)w. We can solve the constrained problem as an unconstrained Lagrange optimization
problem with the Lagrange function of L(p, w, z) = λd( 1α − 1)w + zλd(αp − w), where z is the
nonzero Lagrange multiplier.14 We substitute the values of p and w given by (17) and (11) and
the fact that λ = λ¯s into the Lagrange function L(p, w, z), and can obtain the following optimality
conditions from the three first-order conditions, δLδk = 0,
δL
δs = 0, and
δL
δz = 0, respectively:
(
1
α
− 1)2k
K
+ z
[
cµα
ρ
√
2(n+1)
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
− 2k
K
]
= 0, (29)
(1− 2s)− cρ
√
2(n+1)−1
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
= 0, (30)
α
[
1− s− c
kµ
(
ρ
√
2(n+1)−1
1− ρ
)]
− k
2
Kλd
= 0. (31)
We next use the optimality conditions (30) and (31) to establish the following properties:
(i) ρ∗ and k∗ change in the same direction for any fixed n, α, K, c and µ;
(ii) λ∗ and k∗ change in the same direction for any fixed n, α, K, c, d and µ;
(iii) ρ∗ and w∗ change in the same direction for any fixed n, α, K, c and µ;
(iv) ρ∗ and W
∗
q
d change in the same direction for any fixed n, α, K, c and µ;
(v) ρ∗ and s∗ change in the opposite direction for any fixed n, α, K and c.
First, we can substitute (30) into (31) and use ρ = λdkµ < 1 to obtain
α
2
[
1 + c
ρ
√
2(n+1)−1
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ − 2
)]
− k
ρKµ
= 0. (32)
14We ignore the constraints that 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ k ≤ K to simplify our exposition in the proof, but the analysis
can be easily adapted to include these constraints as well.
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We can show that the left side of (32) increases in ρ but decreases in k for any fixed n, α, K, c and
µ. Thus, ρ∗ and k∗ must change in the same direction, which prove (i).
Since λ = ρkµd , and ρ
∗ and k∗ must change in the same direction as proved in (i), ρ∗, k∗ and λ∗
must all change in the same direction for any fixed n, α, K, c, d and µ. This prove (ii).
We can use (11) to rewrite (32) as
α
2
{
1 +
c
wKµ2(1− ρ)
[
ρ
√
2(n+1)−2
(√
2(n+ 1)− 2
)
+
ρ
√
2(n+1)−1
1− ρ
]}
− w = 0. (33)
The left side of (33) increases in ρ but decreases in w for any fixed n, α, K, c and µ. Thus, the
values of ρ and w at optimality must change in the same direction, which proves (iii).
We can use (16) to rewrite (32) as
ρ
(
1− c
d
Wq
)
− c
d
Wq(1− ρ)
[
(
√
2(n+ 1)− 2)
]
+
2dρ
√
2(n+1)−2
Kαµ2Wq
− 1 = 0. (34)
The left side of (34) decreases in
Wq
d but increases in ρ for any fixed n, α, K, c and µ. This shows
that the values of
Wq
d and ρ at optimality must change in the same direction for any fixed n, α, K,
c and µ, which proves (iv).
Finally, we can again use (16) to rewrite (30) as
(1− 2s)− c
d
Wq
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
= 0,
or equivalently,
s =
1
2
[
1− c
d
Wq
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)]
.
We show in (iv) that the values of ρ and
Wq
d at optimality change in the same direction for any
fixed n, α, µ, K and c. It then follows that the value of ρ and s at optimality must change in the
opposite direction, which proves (v).
We can now rewrite (30) as
(1− 2λ
λ¯
)− c
d
Wq
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
= 0. (35)
We have shown in (i), (ii) and (iv) that the values of λ,
Wq
d and ρ at optimality change in the same
direction for any fixed n, α, K, c, d and µ. We can deduce from (35) that the values of λ,
Wq
d
and ρ at optimality must all increase when λ¯ increases. It then follow from (iii) that w∗ (and thus
p∗ = w
∗
α ) increases when λ¯ increases.
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We can also use ρ = λ¯s
∗d
kµ to express d as d =
ρkµ
λ¯s
. It follows from (i) and (v) that the value of
ρ at optimality must change in the same direction as k, but in opposite direction of s for any fixed
n, α, K, c and µ. Therefore, we can deduce that, at optimality, the values of ρ and k must increase
while the value of s must decrease when d increases. From (iii), we can also conclude that w∗ (and
thus p∗ = w
∗
α ) increases when d increases.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
To prove that there is a unique fixed point, n∗ = k∗(n∗), we shall show that there exists only one
solution (λ∗, k∗) that can satisfy the two first-order conditions, (20) and (21), at the same time if
we set n = k in (20) and (21). As s = λ
λ¯
, we use s instead of λ in our analysis here.
First, observe that the left side of (20) decreases in k but increases in s (or λ). Therefore, for
any fixed s, there exists only one k, denoted by k(s), such that (s, k(s)) satisfies (20), and that k(s)
increases in s. Next, let
h(ρ, k) = c
ρ
√
2(k+1)−1
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(k + 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
,
so that we can espress the first-order condition (21) as
1− 2s− h(ρ, k) = 0 (36)
Taking the second derivative of (36) with respect to s, we obtain
−∂h
2(ρ, k)
∂ρ2
(
∂ρ
∂s
)2
− ∂h(ρ, k)
∂ρ
∂2ρ
∂s2
− ∂h
2(ρ, k)
∂k2
(
∂k
∂s
)2
− ∂h(ρ, k)
∂k
∂2k
∂s2
= 0. (37)
We can further expand ∂
2ρ
∂s2
= ∂
2ρ
∂k2
(
∂k
∂s
)2
+ ∂ρ∂k
(
∂2k
∂s2
)
and rewrite (37) as
−∂h
2(ρ, k)
∂ρ2
(
∂ρ
∂s
)2
− ∂h(ρ, k)
∂ρ
∂2ρ
∂k2
(
∂k
∂s
)2
− ∂h
2(ρ, k)
∂k2
(
∂k
∂s
)2
−
[
∂h(ρ, k)
∂k
+
∂ρ
∂k
]
∂2k
∂s2
= 0. (38)
Since both ρ
√
2(k+1)−1
1−ρ and
ρ
1−ρ are convexly increasing in ρ, we have
∂h2(ρ,k)
∂ρ2
> 0. Also, it is
straightforward to show that ∂h(ρ,k)∂ρ > 0 and
∂2ρ
∂k2
= 2λd
k3µ
> 0. Furthermore, we can prove that both
ρ
√
2(k+1)−1
1−ρ and
√
2(k+1)+ ρ
1−ρ
k are convexly decreasing k, so that h(ρ, k) is also convexly decreasing
in k. Therefore, ∂h
2(ρ,k)
∂k2
> 0 and ∂h(ρ,k)∂k < 0. Finally,
∂ρ
∂k = − λdk2µ < 0. We can then infer from (38)
that ∂
2k
∂s2
> 0. Thus, we have established that k(s) is convexly increasing in s, with k(0) = 0.
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For any (s∗, k∗) that satisfies both (20) and (21), we have
2k2
K
= λ¯d(1− 2s)s. (39)
Thus, for any fixed s, there exists only one k(s) satisfying (39). Furthermore, k(s) first increases
in s, and then decreases in s with k(0) = k(12) = 0 and
∂k
∂s |s=0 →∞.
Overall, we use (36) to show that k(s) is convexly increasing in s with k(0) = 0, and use (39) to
show that k(s) first increases in s, and then decreases in s with k(0) = k(12) = 0. Therefore, there
exists only one solution (s∗, k∗) that can satisfy both (36) and (39) when n = k. In other words,
there exists a unique fixed point, k∗(n∗) = n∗.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
To establish the analytical results for the general model with a dynamic payout ratio, we first
provide some preliminary result for a special case for the general model by imposing a fixed target
service level s. In particular, assume that the model parameter s (or equivalently, the customer
request rate λ because λ = sλ¯) is exogenously given and the optimization problem (8) is reduced
to:
max
k
pi(k) ≡ λd
[
(1− s)− cρ
√
2(n+1)−1
kµ(1− ρ) −
k2
Kλd
]
, subject to
λd
kµ
< 1.
The results for this special case are based on the following more general settings than the
simplifying assumptions as stated in Assumption 1. Specifically, we assume that Wq, F (.) and G(.)
satisfy the following assumptions:
Assumption 2: The expected waiting time function Wq is convex and increasing in λ, and is
convex and decreasing in both k and µ. Furthermore, ∂∂λ(
∂Wq
∂k ) < 0,
∂
∂d(
∂Wq
∂k ) < 0 and
∂
∂µ(
∂Wq
∂k ) > 0.
Observe that the convexity of the waiting time function Wq is valid for an M/M/k queueing
model with arrival rate λ and service rate µd ; e.g., see Lee and Cohen (1983). The three conditions,
∂
∂λ(
∂Wq
∂k ) < 0,
∂
∂d(
∂Wq
∂k ) < 0 and
∂
∂µ(
∂Wq
∂k ) > 0, basically require that the marginal decrease in
waiting time due to an additional service provider is larger at a higher system utilization level.
This assumption is reasonable, and is also supported by the waiting time function of an M/M/k
queuing system. However, we do not require any specific functional form of Wq.
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Assumption 3: The cumulative value distribution F (.) is strictly increasing. The cumulative wage
distribution G(.) is concave and strictly increasing.
Assumption 3 stipulates that the density of the reservation wage rate r is decreasing, which
implies that there are more service providers who would be willing to participate and offer service
at a lower minimum earning rate. Clearly, Assumption 1 implies Assumptions 2 and 3.
Under Assumptions 2 and 3 and with a fixed value of s, we can obtain the following result:
Lemma 1 The profit function pi(k) given in (7) is concave in k. Also, the optimal number of
participating providers k∗ satisfies the following first-order condition:
−cλ∂Wq
∂k
= G−1(
k
K
) +G
′−1(
k
K
)
k
K
= G−1(β) + βG
′−1(β) =
∂(βG−1(β))
∂β
. (40)
Proof of Lemma 1: Differentiate the profit function given in (7) with respect to k and obtain
pi′(k) = −cλ∂Wq
∂k
−
[
G−1(
k
K
) +G
′−1(
k
K
)
k
K
]
(41)
and
pi′′(k) = −λc∂
2Wq
∂k2
−
[
2G
′−1(
k
K
)
1
K
+G
′′−1(
k
K
)
k
K2
]
. (42)
Assumption 3 implies that G−1(.) is convex and increasing. Together with Assumption 2, it follows
that pi′′(k) < 0, which shows that pi(k) is concave in k. Therefore, the optimal value of k is given
by the first-order condition pi′(k) = 0, which is given in (40). This completes our proof.
The first-order condition given in (40) can be interpreted as follows. The left side of (40)
measures the marginal reduction in waiting cost for each additional service provider joining the
platform. In view of (5), the term G−1(β) = w · λdk represents the average earning rate of a
provider. Hence, by noting that β = k/K, the right side of (40) can be interpreted as the marginal
benefit associated with the increase in the average earning rate for each additional service provider
participating in the platform in terms of β. Therefore, the first-order condition (40) shows that the
optimal value of k is achieved when marginal cost equals marginal benefit.
By using the implicit function theorem to analyze the first-order condition (40), we can establish
the following proposition:
Proposition A1: Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Then,
(a) When K increases, both k∗ and p∗ increase, but the ratio β = k
∗
K decreases.
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(b) When µ increases, both k∗ and w∗ decrease.
(c) When c increases, both k∗ and w∗ increase.
(d) When λ¯ (or s) increases, k∗ increases.
(e) When d increases, k∗ increases.
Proof of Proposition A1: (a) Suppose that k0 denotes the optimal value of k for K = K0. Using
the first-order condition (40) and expressing the profit pi as a function of k, we have
pi′(k0) = −λc∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂k
|k=k0 −
[
G−1(
k0
K0
) +G
′−1(
k0
K0
)
k0
K0
]
= 0 (43)
Note that G
′−1(.) is an increasing function since G−1(.) is convex as G(.) is concave by Assumption
3, which implies that {G−1(k0K ) +G
′−1(k0K )
k0
K } is decreasing in K. Therefore, for any K1 > K0,
−λc∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂k
|k=k0 −
[
G−1(
k0
K1
) +G
′−1(
k0
K1
)
k0
K1
]
> 0.
Since the profit function is concave in k, the optimal k∗ must be greater than k0 for any fixed
K = K1 > K0, which shows that the optimal k
∗ is increasing in K. Since the waiting time Wq is
decreasing in k, the optimal p∗ given in (3) is also increasing in K.
Let β0 =
k0
K0
, and rewrite the derivative of the profit function (43) as
pi′(k0) = −λc∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂k
|k=k0 −
{
G−1(β0) +G
′−1(β0)β0
}
= 0, (44)
Let k1 be the optimal value of k when K = K1 > K0, and define β1 =
k1
K1
. Then,
pi′(k1) = −λc∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂k
|k=k1 −
{
G−1(β1) +G
′−1(β1)β1
}
= 0. (45)
Since k∗ is increasing in K, we have k1 > k0. Thus, −λc∂Wq(λ,k,µ,d)∂k |k=k1 < −λc∂Wq(λ,k,µ,d)∂k |k=k0 .
From (44) and (45), we can obtain
G−1(β1) +G
′−1(β1)β1 < G−1(β0) +G
′−1(β0)β0.
Since G−1(β) +G′−1(β)β is an increasing function in β, we can conclude that β1 < β0. Therefore,
β∗ is decreasing in K.
(b) Let k0 denote the optimal k when µ = µ0. Then,
pi′(k0) = −λc∂Wq(λ, k, µ0, d)
∂k
|k=k0 −
[
G−1(
k0
K
) +G
′−1(
k0
K
)
k0
K
]
= 0
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We have ∂∂µ(
∂Wq
∂k ) > 0 from Assumption 2. Then, for any µ1 > µ0,
−λc∂Wq(λ, k, µ1, d)
∂k
|k=k0 −
[
G−1(
k0
K
) +G
′−1(
k0
K
)
k0
K
]
< 0,
Therefore, the optimal k∗ must be smaller than k0 for any fixed µ = µ1 > µ0, which shows that
the optimal k∗ is decreasing in µ. From (6), the wage rate is increasing in k∗, therefore, w∗ is
decreasing in µ.
(c) Suppose that k0 denotes the optimal value of k for c = c0. Then,
pi′(k0) = −λc0∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂k
|k=k0 −
[
G−1(
k0
K
) +G
′−1(
k0
K
)
k0
K
]
= 0
It is clear that for any c1 > c0,
−λc1∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂k
|k=k0 −
[
G−1(
k0
K
) +G
′−1(
k0
K
)
k0
K
]
> 0.
Therefore, the optimal k∗ must be greater than k0 for any fixed c = c1 > c0, which shows that the
optimal k∗ is increasing in c. It is clear from (6) that the wage rate w is increasing in k. Therefore,
the optimal w∗ is also increasing in c.
(d) Since λ = λ¯s, it suffices to show that k∗ is increasing in λ. Let k0 denote the optimal k
when λ = λ0. Then,
pi′(k0) = −λ0c∂Wq(λ0, k, µ, d)
∂k
|k=k0 −
[
G−1(
k0
K
) +G
′−1(
k0
K
)
k0
K
]
= 0.
We have ∂∂λ(
∂Wq
∂k ) < 0 from Assumption 2, which implies that −λc∂Wq(λ,k,µ,d)∂k |k=k0 is increasing in
λ. Therefore, for any λ1 > λ0, we have
−λ1c∂Wq(λ1, k, µ, d)
∂k
|k=k0 −
[
G−1(
k0
K
) +G
′−1(
k0
K
)
k0
K
]
> 0.
Therefore, the optimal k∗ must be greater than k0 for any fixed λ = λ1 > λ0, which shows that the
optimal k∗ is increasing in λ.
(e) When d = d0, let k0 denote the optimal k. The first-order condition shows,
pi′(k0) = −λc∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d0)
∂k
|k=k0 −
[
G−1(
k0
K
) +G
′−1(
k0
K
)
k0
K
]
= 0
Since from assumption 1, we know ∂∂d(
∂Wq
∂k ) < 0. Therefore, for any d1 > d0, we must have,
−λc∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d1)
∂k
|k=k0 −
[
G−1(
k0
K
) +G
′−1(
k0
K
)
k0
K
]
> 0,
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The optimal k∗ must be greater than k0 for any d = d1 > d0, which shows that the optimal k∗ is
increasing in d.
We can now proceed to prove the results of Proposition 4. First. we shall show that the optimal
(λ∗, k∗) is given by the two first-order conditions (20) and (21). As s = λ
λ¯
, we use s instead of λ in
our analysis here. For easier reference, we provide the two conditions below:
∂pi
∂k
= cµ
ρ
√
2(n+1)
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
− 2k
K
= 0 (46)
∂pi
∂s
= λ¯d
{
(1− 2s)− cρ
√
2(n+1)−1
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)}
= 0 (47)
We can use the same argument in the proof of Proposition 3 to establish the result that for
any given n, there exists a unique solution (s∗, k∗) to (46) and (47). Furthermore, we shall show
that this unique stationary point is a global maximum. Suppose that this stationary point is not
a global maximum. Then, the maximum point must be at the boundaries, i.e., 1) s = 0; 2) k = 0;
3) ρ = 1; 4) s = 1; or 5) k = ∞. For the first three cases, the profit function (18) takes a value
of −∞. For s = 1, it is easy to verify that ∂pi∂s < 0, which implies that the platform can increase
profit by reducing s, and so s = 1 cannot be optimal. Finally, when k = ∞, ∂pi∂k < 0, which shows
that the platform can increase profit by reducing k, and so k = ∞ cannot be optimal. Therefore,
the unique stationary point must be a global maximum.
In the following, we shall use (47) to study the behavior of s∗, and use (46) to characterize the
behavior of k∗ as a function of s∗.
(a) Let (s0, k0) and (s1, k1) be the optimal values of (s, k) when K = K0 and K = K1, respec-
tively. Suppose that K1 > K0. We shall show that s1 ≥ s0 and k1 ≥ k0, which implies that both
s∗ and k∗ increase when K increases.
We use the notation k∗(K, s) to denote the optimal value of k for the general model with
parameter K and fixed service level s. In particular, k∗(K0, s0) = k0 and k∗(K1, s1) = k1. Since
K1 > K0, it follows from Proposition A1(a) that k
∗(K1, s0) ≥ k∗(K0, s0) = k0. It is clear that the
derivative ∂pi∂s given in (47) is increasing in k. Since (s0, k0) satisfies the first-order condition
∂pi
∂s = 0
and k∗(K1, s0) ≥ k0 , we have
(1− 2s0)− c
[
λ¯s0d
k∗(K1,s0)µ
]√2(n+1)−1
k∗(K1, s0)µ(1− λ¯s0dk∗(K1,s0)µ)
√2(n+ 1) + λ¯s0dk∗(K1,s0)µ
1− λ¯s0dk∗(K1,s0)µ
 ≥ 0.
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Therefore, the optimal value of s must be greater than s0 when K = K1, as pi(s, k
∗(s)) is concave
in s. Since (s1, k1) is optimal at K = K1, this proves that s1 ≥ s0. Also, it follows from Proposition
A1(d) that k1 = k
∗(K1, s1) ≥ k∗(K1, s0) ≥ k0. Thus, we prove that both s∗ and k∗ increase in K.
Using (11), (46) and (47), we have
1− 2s = cρ
√
2(n+1)−1
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
= 2w. (48)
This proves that w∗ decreases in K since s∗ increases in K.
We next show that W ∗q decreases in K. First, we can rewrite (47) as
λ¯sd(1−2s) = λd
[
c
ρ
√
2(n+1)−1
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)]
= c
ρ
√
2(n+1)
1− ρ
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
. (49)
Clearly, the right side of (49) is increasing in ρ. Also, the left side of (49) implies that 0 < s∗ ≤ 12 .
Suppose that 0 < s∗ < 14 . In this case, the left side of (49) increases in s. Since s
∗ increases in K
as proved earlier, we can conclude that ρ∗ must also increase in K in this case. We can use the
first-order condition (47) and ((16) to deduce that
(1− 2s∗) = cWq
d
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
. (50)
Since s∗ increases in K, the left side of (50) must be decreasing as K increases. On the other hand,
we have shown that ρ∗ increases in K in this case, which implies that ρ
∗
1−ρ∗ must be increasing in
K in this case. We can conclude from (50) that W ∗q must be decreasing as K increases in this case.
Now suppose that 14 ≤ s∗ ≤ 12 . In this case, the left side of (49) decreases in s. Since s∗ increases
in K, we can conclude from (49) that ρ∗ must be decreasing in K in this case. Also, we can deduce
from (16) that
W ∗q
d
=
ρ∗
√
2(n+1)−1
k∗µ(1− ρ∗) . (51)
As K increases, k∗ increases and ρ∗ decreases. Since the right side of (51) decreases in k∗ but
increases in ρ∗, we can conclude from (51) that W
∗
q
d (or equivalently W
∗
q ) must also be decreasing
in K in this case.
Furthermore,
pi = λd(p− w) = λd(1− s− c
d
Wq − w) = λd(1
2
− c
d
Wq), (52)
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where the last equality follows from (48). Since λ∗ increases in K and W ∗q decreases in K, we can
conclude that pi∗ increases in K.
(b) Similarly, let (s0, k0) and (s1, k1) be the optimal values of (s, k) when µ = µ0 and µ = µ1,
respectively. Suppose that µ1 > µ0. Again, we use the notation k
∗(µ, s) to denote the optimal
value of k for the general model with parameter µ and fixed service level s such that k∗(µ0, s0) = k0
and k∗(µ1, s1) = k1. We also use the notation ρ∗(µ, s) and W ∗q (µ, s) to denote the corresponding
optimal values of ρ and Wq for the general model with fixed µ and s.
Proposition A1(b) shows that k∗(µ, s) decreases in µ. We next show that ρ∗(µ, s) and W ∗q (µ, s)
also decrease in µ. We can rewrite the first-order condition (46) as
c
[ρ∗(µ, s)]
√
2(n+1)
1− ρ∗(µ, s)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(µ, s)
1− ρ∗(µ, s)
)
=
2[k∗(µ, s)]2
K
,
or equivalently,
k∗(µ, s) =
√
cK
[ρ∗(µ, s)]
√
2(n+1)
2[1− ρ∗(µ, s)]
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(µ, s)
1− ρ∗(µ, s)
)
.
It is clear from the above equation that ρ∗(µ, s) increases as k∗(µ, s) increases. Since k∗(µ, s)
decreases in µ, ρ∗(µ, s) must also decrease in µ.
Using (16), we can also rewrite the first-order condition (46) as
c
[
µW ∗q (µ, s)
d
∗]2
1
ρ∗(µ, s)
√
2(n+1)−2
[
(
√
2(n+ 1)− 1)(1− ρ∗(µ, s)) + 1
]
=
2
K
.
This implies that µdW
∗
q (µ, s) increases as ρ
∗(µ, s) increases. Since ρ∗(µ, s) decreases in µ, W ∗q (µ, s)
must also decrease in µ. Then, the function
H(µ) = c
ρ∗(µ, s)
√
2(n+1)−1
k∗(µ, s)µ(1− ρ∗(µ, s))
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(µ, s)
1− ρ∗(µ, s)
)
= c
W ∗q (µ, s)
d
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(µ, s)
1− ρ∗(µ, s)
)
decreases in µ.
Since (s0, k0) is the optimal solution when µ = µ0, they satisfy the first-order condition (47):
λ¯d
{
(1− 2s0)− c
W ∗q (µ0, s0)
d
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(µ0, s0)
1− ρ∗(µ0, s0)
)}
= 0. (53)
Since H(µ) decreases in µ and µ1 > µ0, it follows from (53) that
λ¯d
{
(1− 2s0)− c
W ∗q (µ1, s0)
d
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(µ1, s0)
1− ρ∗(µ1, s0)
)}
≥ 0.
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Therefore, the optimal value of s must be greater than s0 when µ = µ1, i.e., s1 ≥ s0. This proves
that s∗ increases in µ. It then follows immediately from (48) that w∗ decreases in µ.
Similarly, we then show that W ∗q decreases in µ. Suppose that 0 < s∗ <
1
4 . In (49), the left side
increases in s and the right side is increasing in ρ. Since s∗ increases in µ, therefore, ρ∗ must also
increase in µ. In (50), the left side decreases in µ, as s∗ is increasing in µ. Since ρ∗ increases in µ
in this case, ρ
∗
1−ρ∗ must also increase in µ. We can conclude from (50) that W
∗
q must be decreasing
as µ.
On the other hand, suppose that 14 ≤ s∗ ≤ 12 . In this case, the left side of (49) decreases in s.
As we have proved that s∗ increases in µ, it then follows from (49) that ρ∗ must be decreasing in
µ in this case.
Using (46) and (16), we obtain
c(
µWq
d
∗
)2
1
ρ∗
√
2(n+1)−2
[
(
√
2(n+ 1)− 1)(1− ρ∗) + 1
]
=
2
K
. (54)
The left side of (54) decreases in ρ∗ but increases in W ∗q . Since ρ∗ increases in µ in this case, we can
conclude that W ∗q must be decreasing in µ in this case. Since λ∗ = λ¯s∗ increases and W ∗q decreases
in µ, it follows from (52) that pi∗ increases in µ. This proves part (i).
(c) Let (s0, k0) and (s1, k1) be the optimal values of (s, k) when c = c0 and c = c1, respectively.
Suppose that c1 > c0. Here, we use the notation k
∗(c, s) to denote the optimal value of k for the
general model with parameter c and fixed service level s such that k∗(c0, s0) = k0 and k∗(c1, s1) = k1.
Since c1 > c0, it follows from Proposition A1(c) that k
∗(c1, s0) ≥ k∗(c0, s0) = k0. Therefore,
ρ∗(c1, s0) = λ¯dk∗(c1,s0)µ ≤ ρ∗(c0, s0) = ρ0. Then,
c0
ρ
√
2(n+1)
0
1− ρ0
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ0
1− ρ0
)
=
2k20
K
≤ 2k
∗(c1, s0)2
K
= c1
ρ∗(c1, s0)
√
2(n+1)
1− ρ∗(c1, s0)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(c1, s0)
1− ρ∗(c1, s0)
)
,
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where the two equalities come from the first-order condition (46) and the fact that k0 and k
∗(c1, s0)
are the optimal values of k for the general model with s = s0 when c = c0 and c = c1, respectively.
Since (s0, k0) is the optimal solution when c = c0, they satisfy the first-order condition (47):
(1− 2s0)− c0 ρ
√
2(n+1)−1
0
k0µ(1− ρ0)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ0
1− ρ0
)
= 0. (56)
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Combining (55) and (56), we obtain
(1− 2s0)− c1 ρ
∗(c1, s0)
√
2(n+1)−1
k∗(c1, s0)µ[1− ρ∗(c1, s0)]
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(c1, s0)
1− ρ∗(c1, s0)
)
≤ 0.
Therefore, the optimal value of s must be smaller than s0 when c = c1, as pi(s, k
∗(s)) is concave in
s. This proves that s∗ is decreasing in c. It then follows from (48) that w∗ is increasing in c.
Also, we can use (6) to express ρ∗ =
√
λ¯s∗d
Kµ2w∗ , where ρ
∗ = λ
∗d
k∗µ and λ
∗ = λ¯s∗. Since s∗ is
decreasing in c and w∗ is increasing in c, ρ∗ is decreasing in c. From (54) we know that W ∗q is
decreasing in c since ρ∗ is decreasing in c.
Since both s∗ and ρ∗ decrease in c, it follows from (50) that cWq increases in c. Since λ∗ = λ¯s∗
decreases in c, it follows from (52) that pi∗ is decreasing in c. This proves part (ii).
(d) Now let (s0, k0) and (s1, k1) be the optimal values of (s, k) when λ¯ = λ¯0 and λ¯ = λ¯1,
respectively. Suppose that λ¯1 > λ¯0. Again, we use the notation k
∗(λ¯, s) to denote the optimal value
of k for the general model with parameter λ¯ and fixed service level s. In particular, k∗(λ¯0, s0) = k0
and k∗(λ¯1, s1) = k1. We also use the notation ρ∗(λ¯, s) and W ∗q (λ¯, s) denote the corresponding
optimal values of ρ and Wq for the general model with fixed λ¯ and s.
Proposition A1(d) shows that k∗(λ¯, s) increases in λ¯. We can use the same argument as given
in part (b) to show that ρ∗(λ¯, s) and W ∗q (λ¯, s) also increase in λ¯. This implies that the function
H(λ¯) =
ρ∗(λ¯, s)
√
2(n+1)−1
k∗(λ¯, s)µ(1− ρ∗(λ¯, s))
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(λ¯, s)
1− ρ∗(λ¯, s)
)
=
W ∗q (λ¯, s)
d
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(λ¯, s)
1− ρ∗(λ¯, s)
)
increases in λ¯ since ρ1−ρ is an increasing function in ρ.
Since (s0, k0) is the optimal solution when λ¯ = λ0, they satisfy the first-order condition (47):
λ¯0d
{
(1− 2s0)− c
W ∗q (λ¯0, s0)
d
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(λ¯0, s0)
1− ρ∗(λ¯0, s0)
)}
= 0. (57)
Since H(λ¯) increases in λ¯ and λ¯1 > λ¯0, it follows from (57) that
λ¯1d
{
(1− 2s0)− c
W ∗q (λ¯1, s0)
d
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(λ¯1, s0)
1− ρ∗(λ¯1, s0)
)}
≤ 0.
Therefore, the optimal value of s must be smaller than s0 when λ¯ = λ¯1, i.e., s1 ≤ s0. This proves
that s∗ decreases in λ¯. Then, it follows immediately from (48) that w∗ increases in λ¯.
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Using (54), ρ∗ and W ∗q must change in the same direction as λ¯ increases. Also we can rewrite
(46) as
c
ρ
√
2(n+1)
(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
=
2k2
K
, (58)
Since the left side is increasing in ρ and the right side is increasing in k, ρ∗ and k∗ must change in
the same direction as λ¯ increases. Thus, we can conclude that k∗, ρ∗ and W ∗q must all change in
the same direction when λ¯ increases.
Since s∗ decreases in λ¯, the left side of (50) increases in λ¯, which implies that the right side of
(50) also increases in λ¯. Since W ∗q and ρ∗ must change in the same direction as λ¯ increases, we can
conclude that both W ∗q and ρ∗ increases in λ¯. As k∗, ρ∗ and W ∗q all change in the same direction
when λ¯ increases, we must have k∗ increases in λ¯ and that λ∗ = ρ
∗k∗µ
d increases in λ¯.
Using (47) and (16), we obtain
s =
1
2
{
1− cρ
√
2(n+1)−1
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)}
=
1
2
{
1− c
d
Wq
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)}
.
We substitute the above equation into (3) to obtain
p = 1− 1
2
{
1− c
d
Wq
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)}
− c
d
Wq =
1
2
{
1 +
c
d
Wq
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ − 1
)}
.
(59)
Since both W ∗q and ρ∗ increases in λ¯, it follows from (59) that p∗ increases in λ¯.
Let pi∗1 and pi∗0 denote the optimal profit when λ¯ = λ¯1 and λ¯ = λ¯0, respectively. Also, let pi∗(λ¯, s)
denote the optimal profit for the general model with fixed values of λ¯ and s. For any (λ¯, s) with a
fixed value of λ = λ¯s, observe from (46) that the optimal values of k remain the same. Furthermore,
it follows from (11) and (16) that the corresponding values of W ∗q and w∗ are also the same. Using
(52), this implies that
pi∗(λ¯1,
λ¯0s0
λ¯1
) = λ¯0s0d(1− λ¯0s0
λ¯1
− c
d
W ∗q − w∗) ≥ λ¯0s0d(1− s0 −
c
d
W ∗q − w∗) = pi∗(λ¯0, s0),
when λ¯1 > λ¯0. Then,
pi∗1 = pi
∗(λ¯1, s1) ≥ pi∗(λ¯1, λ¯0s0
λ¯1
) ≥ pi∗(λ¯0, s0) = pi∗0,
where the first inequality is due to the fact that (k1, s1) is the optimal solution when λ¯ = λ¯1. This
proves that pi∗ increases in λ¯.
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(e) Let (s0, k0) and (s1, k1) be the optimal values of (s, k) when d = d0 and d = d1 > d0,
respectively. We use the notation k∗(d, s) to denote the optimal value of k for the general model
with parameter d and fixed service level s such that k∗(d0, s0) = k0 and k∗(d1, s1) = k1. We also
use the notation ρ∗(d, s) and W ∗q (d, s) to denote the corresponding optimal values of ρ and Wq for
the general model with fixed d and s.
Proposition A1(e) shows that k∗(d, s) increases when d increases. We can use the same argument
as given in part (b) to show that ρ∗(d, s) and W
∗
q (d,s)
d also increase when d increases. Then,
H(d) =
ρ∗(d, s)
√
2(n+1)−1
k∗(d, s)µ(1− ρ∗(d, s))
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(d, s)
1− ρ∗(d, s)
)
=
W ∗q (d, s)
d
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(d, s)
1− ρ∗(d, s)
)
increases in d.
Since (s0, k0) is the optimal solution when d = d0, they satisfy the first-order condition (47):
λ¯d0
{
(1− 2s0)− c
W ∗q (d0, s0)
d0
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(d0, s0)
1− ρ∗(d0, s0)
)}
= 0. (60)
Since H(d) increases in d and d1 > d0, it follows from (60) that
λ¯d1
{
(1− 2s0)− c
W ∗q (d1, s0)
d1
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗(d1, s0)
1− ρ∗(d1, s0)
)}
≤ 0.
Therefore, the optimal value of s must be smaller than s0 when d = d1, i.e., s1 ≤ s0. This proves
that s∗ decreases in d. It then follows immediately from (48) that w∗ increases in d.
We can use (54) to deduce that ρ∗ and W
∗
q
d must change in the same direction when d increases.
We can also use (58) to deduce that ρ∗ and k∗ must change in the same direction when d increases.
Thus, we can conclude that k∗, ρ∗ and W
∗
q
d must all change in the same direction when d increases.
Since s∗ decreases in d, we can use (50) and the fact that both ρ∗ and W
∗
q
d must change in the same
direction to conclude that both ρ∗ and W
∗
q
d increase in d, which implies that k
∗ and W ∗q increase in
d. Also, it follows from (59) that p∗ increases in d.
Let pi∗1 and pi∗0 denote the optimal profit when d = d1 and d = d0, respectively. Also, let pi∗(d, s)
denote the optimal profit for the general model with any fixed values of d and s. For any (d, s)
with a fixed ratio of ds in the general model, it is easy to check from (46) that the optimal values
of k remain the same, and from (11) and (16) that the corresponding values of W˜ ∗q =
W ∗q
d and w
∗
are also the same. Then,
pi∗(d1,
d0s0
d1
) = λ¯s0d0(1− d0s0
d1
− cW˜ ∗q − w∗) ≥ λ¯s0d0(1− s0 − cW˜ ∗q − w∗) = pi∗(d0, s0),
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when d1 > d0. Then,
pi∗1 = pi
∗(d1, s1) ≥ pi∗(d1, d0s0
d1
) ≥ pi∗(d0, s0) = pi∗0,
where the first inequality is due to the fact that (k1, s1) is the optimal solution when d = d1.
Therefore, pi∗ increases in d. This proves part (iii).
Let α∗ = w
∗
p∗ . As shown in (52), we can express
p∗ − w∗ = ( 1
α∗
− 1)w∗ = 1
2
− c
d
W ∗q . (61)
We have shown in the proof of Proposition 4(c) that w∗ and cW ∗q increase in c and in Proposition
4(d) and (e) that w∗ and W
∗
q
d increase in λ¯ and d. We can then conclude from (61) that α
∗ is
increasing in c, λ¯ and d. On the other hand, we have shown in the proof of Proposition 4(a) that
w∗ and W ∗q decrease in K and Proposition 4(b) that w∗ and W ∗q decrease in µ. Again, we can
conclude from (61) that α∗ is decreasing in K and µ.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose 1 > 0 ≥ 1. Let Ki = iKˆ and λ¯i = iλˆ, where i = 0, 1. Let (s0, k0) and (s1, k1) be the
optimal values of (s, k) when  = 0 and  = 1, respectively. We shall first show that s1 ≥ s0 and
k1 ≥ k0, which implies that both s∗ and k∗ increase in .
We use the notation k∗(, s) and ρ∗(, s) to denote the optimal value of k and ρ for the general
model with parameter  and a fixed service level s. In particular, k∗(0, s0) = k0 and k∗(1, s1) = k1.
Since K1 > K0 and λ¯1 > λ¯0, it follows from Proposition A1(a)(d) that k
∗(1, s0) ≥ k∗(0, s0) = k0.
We can rewrite (46) as
c
ρ
√
2(n+1)−1
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
− 2sλ¯d
Kµ2ρ2
= 0. (62)
It is clear that the left side of (62) increases in ρ but decreases in k. Note that λ¯1K1 =
λ¯0
K0
= λ¯K .
Since k∗(1, s0) ≥ k∗(0, s0), we must have ρ∗(1, s0) ≥ ρ∗(0, s0).
We can use (62) to rewrite (47) as
∂pi
∂s
= λ¯d
{
(1− 2s)− 2sλ¯d
Kµ2ρ2
}
= 0.
It is then clear that ∂pi∂s increases in ρ. Since (s0, k0) satisfies the first-order condition
∂pi
∂s = 0 and
ρ∗(1, s0) ≥ ρ∗(0, s0), we must have
λ¯d
{
(1− 2s0)− 2s0λ¯d
Kµ2[ρ∗(1, s0)]2
}
≥ 0.
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Therefore, the optimal value of s must be greater than s0 when  = 1, which proves that s
∗
increases in . Then, it follows immediately from (48) that w∗ decreases in .
We next prove that ρ∗ increases in  by contradiction. Suppose that ρ∗ decreases in . Since
w∗ = (k
∗)2
Kˆλ∗d
= k
∗
Kˆµρ∗
decreases in , k
∗
 must be decreasing in . On the other hand, as ρ
∗ = λˆds
∗
k∗µ
decreases in  and s∗ increases in , k∗ must be decreasing in . This contradicts with the fact that
k∗
 must be decreasing in . Therefore, ρ
∗ increases in .
Since s∗ increases in , the left side of (50) decreases in . On the other hand, we have shown
that ρ∗ increases in , which implies that ρ
∗
1−ρ∗ increases in . Therefore, we can conclude from
(50) that W ∗q must be decreasing as  increases. Since both w∗ and W ∗q decrease in , we can then
conclude from (61) that α∗ = w
∗
p∗ decreases in .
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Let us first adapt the proof of Proposition A1 to establish the same results to this extension. To
establish the result of Proposition A1(a), let k0 denotes the optimal value of k for K = K0. Under
Assumption 1, the first-order condition for Π(k) now becomes
Π′(k0) = −(1− γ)λc∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂k
|k=k0 − (2− 3γ)
k0
K0
= 0, (63)
and we can show that, for any K1 > K0,
−(1− γ)λc∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂k
|k=k0 − (2− 3γ)
k0
K1
> 0.
Therefore, the optimal value of k must be greater than k0 for any fixed K1 > K0, which implies
that k∗ is increasing in K. Using the same argument as before, we can show that p∗ is increasing
in K.
Let β0 =
k0
K0
, we can rewrite the first-order condition (63) as
pi′(k0) = −(1− γ)λc∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂k
|k=k0 − (2− 3γ)β0 = 0, (64)
Let k1 denote the optimal value of k when K = K1 > K0, and define β1 =
k1
K1
. Then,
pi′(k1) = −(1− γ)λc∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂k
|k=k1 − (2− 3γ)β1 = 0. (65)
As k∗ is increasing in K, we have k1 > k0. Therefore, −λc∂Wq(λ,k,µ,d)∂k |k=k1 < −λc∂Wq(λ,k,µ,d)∂k |k=k0 .
Since (2 − 3γ) > 0, we can conclude that β1 < β0. Thus, β∗ is decreasing in K. This proves
Proposition A1(a).
52
The results for Proposition A1(b),(c),(d) and (e) can be proved using the same arguments from
the proof of Proposition A1.
We next adapt the proofs of Propositions 4 and 5 to establish all the corresponding results to
this extension. To illustrate the adaptation, we next outline the proof of the results of Proposition
4(a). We can use similar arguments to prove the rest of the results, but omit the details here.
The two first-order conditions (46) and (47) given in the proof of Proposition 4 now become
∂pi
∂k
= (1− γ)cµ ρ
√
2(n+1)
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
− (2− 3γ)k
K
= 0 (66)
∂pi
∂s
= λ¯d
{
[(1− γ)− (2− 3γ)s]− (1− γ)cρ
√
2(n+1)−1
kµ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)}
= 0. (67)
Let (s0, k0) and (s1, k1) be the optimal values of (s, k) when K = K0 and K = K1, respectively.
Suppose that K1 > K0. We use the notation k
∗(K, s) to denote the optimal value of k for the
general model with parameter K and fixed service level s. Then, k∗(K1, s0) > k∗(K0, s0) in view
of Proposition A1(a). Furthermore, we can use the first-order condition to establish that
[(1− γ)− (2− 3γ)s0]− (1− γ)c
[
λ¯s0d
k∗(K1,s0)µ
]√2(n+1)
k∗(K1, s0)µ
[
1− λ¯s0dk∗(K1,s0)µ
]
√2(n+ 1) + λ¯s0dk∗(K1,s0)µ
1− λ¯s0dk∗(K1,s0)µ
 ≥ 0.
Therefore, the optimal value of s must be greater than s0 when K = K1, as pi(s, k
∗(s)) is concave
in s. Since (s1, k1) is optimal at K = K1, this proves that s1 ≥ s0. Also, it follows from Proposition
A1(d) that k1 = k
∗(K1, s1) ≥ k∗(K1, s0) ≥ k0. Therefore, we prove that both s∗ and k∗ increase in
K.
Using (66) and (67), we can obtain
s+ w =
1− γ
2− 3γ .
It then follows that w∗ decreases in K, as s∗ increases in K.
We next show that W ∗q decreases in K. We can rewrite (67) as
λ¯sd[(1− γ)− (2− 3γ)s] = (1− γ)
[
c
ρ
√
2(n+1)
1− ρ
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)]
. (68)
Clearly, the right side of (68) is increasing in ρ. Also, the left side of (68) implies that 0 < s∗ ≤ 1−γ2−3γ .
Suppose that 0 < s∗ < 1−γ2(2−3γ) . In this case, the left side of (68) increases in s. Since s
∗ increases in
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K as proved earlier, we can conclude that ρ∗ must also increase in K in this case. The first-order
condition (67) implies that
[(1− γ)− (2− 3γ)s∗] = (1− γ) c
d
W ∗q
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ∗
1− ρ∗
)
. (69)
Since s∗ increases in K, the left side of (69) must be decreasing as K increases. On the other hand,
we have shown that ρ∗ increases in K in this case, which implies that ρ
∗
1−ρ∗ must be increasing in
K in this case. We can conclude from (69) that W ∗q must be decreasing as K increases in this case.
Now suppose that 1−γ2(2−3γ) ≤ s∗ ≤ 1−γ2−3γ . In this case, the left side of (68) decreases in s. Since
s∗ increases in K, we can conclude from (68) that ρ∗ must be decreasing in K in this case. Also,
it follows from (16) that
W ∗q
d
=
ρ∗
√
2(n+1)−1
k∗µ(1− ρ∗) . (70)
As K increases, k∗ increases and ρ∗ decreases. Since the right side of (70) decreases in k∗ but
increases in ρ∗, we can conclude from (70) that W
∗
q
d (or equivalently W
∗
q ) must also be decreasing
in K in this case.
Furthermore, we can show that
pi∗ = λ∗d(p∗ − w∗) = λ∗d(1− 2γ
2− 3γ −
c
d
W ∗q ). (71)
Since λ∗ increases in K and W ∗q decreases in K, we can conclude that pi∗ increases in K. Also,
p∗ − w∗ = ( 1
α∗
− 1)w∗ = 1− 2γ
2− 3γ −
c
d
W ∗q . (72)
Since w∗ and W ∗q decrease in K, α∗ is also decreasing in K.
(ii) We first consider the case where s is fixed and show that the optimal k∗ is increasing in γ.
Let k0 denotes the optimal value of k when γ = γ0 ≥ 0. Then,
Π′(k0) = (1−γ0)
[
−λc∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂k
|k=k0 −
{
G−1(
k0
K
) +G
′−1(
k0
K
)
k0
K
}
+
γ0
1− γ0
k0
K
G′−1(
k0
K
)
]
= 0.
For any γ1 > γ0, we must have
γ1
1−γ1
k0
KG
′−1(k0K ) >
γ0
1−γ0
k0
KG
′−1(k0K ). Therefore,
(1− γ1)
[
−λc∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂k
|k=k0 −
{
G−1(
k0
K
) +G
′−1(
k0
K
)
k0
K
}
+
γ1
1− γ1
k0
K
G′−1(
k0
K
)
]
> 0.
Since Π(k) is concave in k, the optimal k∗ must be greater than k0 when γ = γ1 > γ0.
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Now consider the joint optimization problem of (s, k). Let (s0, k0) and (s1, k1) be the optimal
values of (s, k) when γ = γ0 and γ = γ1, respectively. Suppose that γ1 > γ0. The two first-order
conditions are given by
∂pi
∂k
|s=s0,k=k0 = −(1− γ0)cλd2
∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂k
|λ=s0λ¯,k=k0 −
[
(1− γ0)G−1( k0
K0
) + (1− 2γ0)G′−1( k0
K0
)
k0
K0
]
= 0
∂pi
∂s
|s=s0,k=k0 = λ¯
{
d
[
(1− γ0)F−1(1− s0)− (1− 2γ0)s0F ′−1(1− s0)
]
− (1− γ0)cWq(s0λ¯, k0, µ, d)
−(1− γ0)cs0λ¯∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂λ
|λ=λ¯s0,k=k0
}
= 0
Let k∗(γ, s) be the optimal value of k with fixed values of γ and s. As we have shown that the
optimal k∗ is increasing in γ for fixed s, we have k∗(γ1, s0) ≥ k∗(γ0, s0). As both ∂Wq(sλ¯,k,µ,d)∂λ and
Wq(s0λ¯, k, µ, d) decrease in k, we have
d
[
(1− γ1)F−1(1− s0)− (1− 2γ1)s0F ′−1(1− s0)
]
− (1− γ1)cWq(s0λ¯, k∗(γ1, s0), µ, d)
− (1− γ1)cs0λ¯∂Wq(λ, k, µ, d)
∂λ
|λ=λ¯s0,k=k∗(γ1,s0) ≥ 0.
Therefore, the optimal value of s must be greater than s0 when γ = γ1, i.e., s1 ≥ s0. Also,
k1 = k
∗(γ1, s1) ≥ k∗(γ1, s0) ≥ k∗(γ0, s0) = k0. Therefore, both s∗ and k∗ are increasing in γ.
We can use (66) and (67) to cancel out γ and obtain
k = c
(
1 + ρ2
Kµ2
λ¯d
)
ρ
√
2(n+1)−1
µ(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
. (73)
Since k∗ is increasing in γ and the right side of (73) is increasing in ρ, we can conclude that ρ∗ is
increasing in γ. Also, we can rewrite (73) as
c
(
1 + ρ2
Kµ2
λ¯d
)(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
Wq
d
= 1.
Since ρ∗ is increasing in γ, we can conclude that W ∗q is decreasing in γ.
Finally, we can use (11) and (66) to obtain
c
ρ
√
2(n+1)−2
µ2(1− ρ)
(√
2(n+ 1) +
ρ
1− ρ
)
=
2− 3γ
1− γ Kw
2. (74)
Since ρ∗ is increasing in γ, the left side of (74) is increasing in γ. Since 2−3γ1−γ is decreasing in γ, we
can conclude that w∗ is increasing in γ.
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B Some Detailed Statistics from Didi Data
Table 12: Mean and standard deviation of number of drivers, number of rides, and price per km
across differrent hours over weekdays.
Number of drivers Number of rides Price per km
Hour Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
8 879 26 1273 44 2.919 1.196
9 1196 24 2229 37 3.056 1.264
10 1099 31 1725 64 3.028 1.231
11 771 34 1170 69 2.953 1.191
12 707 40 1208 75 2.959 1.229
13 676 33 1210 88 2.915 1.221
14 699 20 1251 44 2.938 1.232
15 691 21 1173 19 2.994 1.240
16 738 79 1177 108 3.025 1.250
17 904 80 1426 138 3.066 1.255
18 1080 42 1713 93 3.134 1.275
19 1211 59 2006 60 3.214 1.319
20 992 56 1550 91 3.039 1.250
21 811 64 1452 97 2.855 1.183
22 752 67 1406 127 2.817 1.197
23 597 64 1029 99 2.799 1.213
24 348 53 552 83 2.727 1.124
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Figure 7: Travel distance distribution across all hours.
Figure 8: Travel time distribution across all hours.
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Table 1: Comparisons of results for the base model with exact formula (9) and approximation (16).
Wq is given by exact formula (9) Wq is given by (16) with n = n
∗
λ¯ k∗ λ∗ p∗ pi∗ n∗ k∗ λ∗ p∗ pi∗
10 7 2.71 0.72 0.98 7.48 7 2.76 0.73 0.98
20 10 5.79 0.69 2.00 10.02 10 6.22 0.64 2.00
30 11 6.20 0.78 2.42 11.57 11 6.34 0.76 2.42
40 12 7.14 0.81 2.88 12.64 12 7.29 0.79 2.88
50 13 8.32 0.81 3.38 13.41 13 8.53 0.79 3.38
60 14 9.80 0.80 3.92 13.99 13 8.05 0.84 3.38
70 14 9.29 0.84 3.92 14.45 14 9.50 0.83 3.92
80 15 11.16 0.81 4.50 14.82 14 9.18 0.85 3.92
90 15 10.62 0.85 4.50 15.13 15 10.97 0.82 4.50
100 15 10.36 0.87 4.50 15.39 15 10.60 0.85 4.50
Table 2: Performance of the approximation scheme for the base model.
k∗ λ∗ p∗ w∗ pi∗
k∗ (5940 cases) 2% 6% 6% 6% 2%
Table 3: Comparisons of results for the general model with exact formula (9) and approximation
(16).
Wq is given by exact formula (9) Wq is given by (16) with n = n
∗
λ¯ k∗ λ∗ p∗ w∗ pi∗ n∗ k∗ λ∗ p∗ w∗ pi∗
10 6 3.32 0.613 0.217 1.32 5.48 6 3.28 0.603 0.220 1.25
20 8 5.14 0.677 0.249 2.20 7.90 8 5.11 0.663 0.259 2.11
30 10 6.87 0.706 0.291 2.85 9.61 10 6.86 0.692 0.292 2.75
40 12 8.61 0.723 0.335 3.34 10.87 11 7.82 0.722 0.310 3.22
50 13 9.55 0.745 0.354 3.73 11.90 12 8.74 0.742 0.330 3.60
60 14 10.47 0.761 0.375 4.04 12.70 13 9.65 0.756 0.350 3.92
70 14 10.55 0.780 0.372 4.31 13.38 14 10.55 0.767 0.371 4.18
80 15 11.44 0.789 0.393 4.53 13.91 14 10.61 0.782 0.369 4.38
90 15 11.49 0.802 0.392 4.71 14.43 15 11.50 0.789 0.391 4.58
100 16 12.39 0.807 0.413 4.88 14.84 15 11.55 0.799 0.390 4.73
Table 4: Ratio of expected profits between using a fixed payout ratio and using the optimal time-
based payout ratio.
α =
λ¯ α∗ .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
10 .35 .55 .89 .82 .74 .65 .53 .31 .17
20 .37 .58 .76 .87 .91 .73 .56 .38 .20
30 .41 .45 .80 .85 .85 .79 .68 .45 .23
40 .46 .38 .68 .90 .86 .78 .66 .48 .27
50 .48 .34 .80 .97 .91 .80 .74 .54 .26
60 .49 .49 .74 .90 .97 .84 .77 .55 .29
70 .48 .46 .69 .84 .91 .89 .72 .56 .30
80 .50 .44 .66 .80 .99 .85 .76 .58 .31
90 .49 .42 .63 .92 .95 .92 .80 .56 .32
100 .51 .41 .61 .89 .92 .89 .78 .59 .31
Table 5: Values of the optimal time-based payout ratio α∗.
K =
λ¯ 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
10 .68 .56 .47 .35 .35 .29 .31 .28 .24 .22
20 .78 .57 .45 .46 .37 .35 .35 .30 .31 .28
30 .75 .62 .54 .46 .41 .38 .37 .36 .32 .31
40 .74 .59 .51 .48 .46 .42 .40 .38 .36 .33
50 .73 .58 .55 .50 .48 .43 .40 .40 .39 .35
60 .72 .57 .53 .52 .49 .44 .44 .41 .39 .37
70 .72 .63 .57 .51 .48 .46 .45 .41 .41 .39
80 .72 .63 .56 .54 .50 .47 .46 .42 .42 .40
90 .71 .62 .56 .53 .49 .49 .47 .43 .43 .40
100 .71 .62 .55 .52 .51 .48 .48 .45 .44 .41
Table 6: Performance of the approximation scheme for the general model.
k∗ λ∗ p∗ w∗ pi∗
k∗ ≤ 10 (4495 cases) 11% 4% 2% 20% 3%
k∗ > 10 (2105 cases) 2% 1% 1% 3% 1%
Table 7: Impact of model parameters on s∗, k∗, W ∗q , λ∗ and ρ∗.
s∗ k∗ W ∗q λ
∗ ρ∗
K ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ×
µ ↑ × ↓ ↑ ×
c ↓ × ↓ ↓ ↓
λ¯ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
d ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑
↑(increasing); ↓(decreasing); ×(non-monotonic)
Table 8: Optimal values of α∗ using the approximation formula (16) with n = n∗.
K =
λ¯ 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
10 .67 .49 .42 .36 .33 .30 .27 .25 .24 .22
20 .67 .52 .46 .41 .37 .34 .32 .30 .28 .27
30 .67 .54 .48 .44 .40 .38 .35 .33 .31 .30
40 .67 .55 .49 .46 .42 .40 .38 .36 .34 .32
50 .67 .56 .51 .47 .44 .42 .39 .38 .36 .34
60 .68 .56 .51 .48 .45 .43 .41 .39 .38 .36
70 .68 .57 .52 .49 .46 .44 .42 .40 .39 .37
80 .68 .57 .53 .49 .47 .45 .43 .41 .40 .39
90 .68 .57 .53 .50 .48 .46 .44 .42 .41 .40
100 .68 .57 .53 .50 .48 .46 .45 .43 .42 .41
Table 9: Impact of growth rate  on p∗, w∗, α∗ and pi∗.
 p∗ w∗ α∗ pi∗
1 0.64 0.43 0.67 0.15
2 0.71 0.37 0.52 0.86
3 0.73 0.35 0.48 1.71
4 0.74 0.34 0.46 2.63
5 0.74 0.33 0.44 3.60
Table 10: Numerical results for the general model to include the total consumer and provider
surplus.
γ p∗ w∗ α∗ pi∗ C∗s + P
∗
s Π
∗ = (1− γ)pi∗ + γ(C∗s + P ∗s )
0.0 0.81 0.41 0.51 4.88 3.33 4.88
0.1 0.80 0.43 0.54 4.84 3.77 4.73
0.2 0.79 0.46 0.58 4.75 4.25 4.65
0.3 0.78 0.50 0.64 4.42 5.28 4.68
0.4 0.75 0.59 0.79 3.11 7.67 4.93
0.5 0.68 0.76 1.12 -2.14 13.84 5.85
0.6 0.52 1.15 2.19 -27.17 34.52 9.84
Table 11: Summary of parameter values for our illustrative examples.
Parameters Peak hour Non-peak hour Data source
K 390 390 Didi data with assumption of 20 equal zones
λ¯ 200 /hour 100 /hour Didi data with assumption of 20 equal zones
d 6 km 6 km Didi data
µ 19 km/hour 26 km/hour Didi data
v U[2,4] RMB/km U[2,4] RMB/km Benchmarked against taxi rate
r U[30,40] RMB/hour U[30,40] RMB/hour Estimated from taxi driver wages
c 0 to 1,000 RMB/hour 0 to 1,000 RMB/hour Assumption for sensitivity analysis
Figure 1: Number of rides and drivers across different hours.
Figure 2: Average travel distance and average price per kilometer across different hours.
Figure 3: Optimal number of participating drivers, optimal price and wage rates during peak hours
(λ¯ = 200 and µ = 19 km/hour).
Figure 4: Optimal number of participating drivers, optimal price and wage rates during non-peak
hours (λ¯ = 100 and µ = 26 km/hour).
Figure 5: Comparisons of the optimal time-based payout ratio between peak and non-peak hours.
Figure 6: Comparisons of optimal profit between the optimal time-based payout ratio and a fixed
payout ratio for the peak hour scenario.
